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NOTES
LIABILITY UNDER UNIFORm FIDUCIARIES ACT OF BANK RECEIVING TRUST
MONEY FROM FIDUCIARY'S PERSONAL ACCOUNT *
IF A depositor places to his personal credit funds held by him in a fiduciary
capacity, the depository bank is usually under no common law duty to inquire
into the propriety of the deposit.1 Furthermore, it may honor checks there-
after drawn on the depositor's account without ascertaining whether the
payments to third parties constitute a proper use of the money.2 But it is on
notice of the character of the deposit to the extent that if it receives in pay-
ment of a personal debt of the depositor any of the fiduciary funds identifia-
ble as such, it is liable as a participant in the breach of trust for the amount
it receives.3 And in many jurisdictions, a bank which wrongfully accepts
trust money is liable for all subsequent unlawful payments from the mixed
account, whether to itself, the depositor, or third parties.
4
Either degree of liability imposes an almost insuperable burden on the
bank in situations where the fiduciary's personal account is at all active. If
there -have been deposits and withdrawals of both trust and personal funds,
the proportion of each in a mixed account at the time of payment to the
bank can only be ascertained by analyzing the amounts and dates (1) of
fiduciary deposits, (2) of personal deposits, (3) of withdrawals for fiduciary
purposes, (4) of withdrawals for personal purposes. The bank can thus
never be sure that it is not receiving trust money unless it has made a suc-
cessful inquiry into the object of every withdrawal. Recognizing the prac-
tical impossibility of banks' conducting so exhaustive an investigation," the
* Colby v. Riggs National Bank, 92 F. (2d) 183 (App. D. C. 1937).
1. Empire Trust Co. v. Cahan, 274 U. S. 473, 57 A. L. R. 925 (1927) ; Whiting v.
Hudson Trust Co., 234 N. Y. 394, 138 N. E. 33 (1923). But cf. Fidelity & Dep. Co.
of Md. v. Queens County Trust Co., 226 N. Y. 225, 123 N. E. 370 (1919).
2. Kendall v. Fidelity Trust Co., 230 Mass. 238, 119 N. E. 861 (1918); Rogers
v. Bankers Nat. Bank, 179 Minn. 197, 229 N..W. 90 (1930). See cases contra in (1932)
6 U. oF CIN. L. REV. 448, 452.
3. Union Stock Yards Bank v. Gillespie, 137 U. S. 411 (1890); Allen v. Puritan
Trust Co., 211 Mass. 409, 97 N. E. 916 (1912) ; Comment (1933) 17 MINN. L. Rv. 405.
4. Bischoff v. Yorkville Bank, 218 N. Y. 106, 112 N. E. 759 (1916); Wichita Roy-
alty Co. v. City Nat. Bank of Wichita Falls, 127 Tex. 158, 89 S. W. (2d) 394 (1935);
see Merrill, Unforgetable Knowledge (1936) 34 Micr. L. Ray. 474, 479.
5. If the purpose of withdrawals cannot be ascertained, they will be presumed to
be from personal funds as long as any remain in the account. Hewitt v. Hayes, 205 Mass.
356, 91 N. E. 332 (1910). One view holds, moreover, that deposits of personal funds
after the trust portion of the mixed account has been depleted by misappropriation are
presumably intended to replenish this deficit; payment of these ostensibly personal de-
posits to the bank would presumably render the bank liable. Myers v. Matusek, 98 Fla.
1126, 125 So. 360 (1929) (minority holding). Contra: Maryland Casualty Co. v. City
National Bank, 29 F. (2d) 662 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 847 (1928).
See 4 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 929.
6. See Scott, Participation in a Breach of Trust (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 454, 480;
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, HANDBOOK AND
PROCEEDINGS (1920) 168.
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Commissioners of Uniform Laws sought to relieve them of this responsi-
bility by abolishing the common law rule upon which liability has hitherto
been based.7 Section 9 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act provides, in effect,
that if a fiduciary deposits trust funds in his personal account, the depository
bank is not bound to inquire into the propriety of the deposit, and is author-
ized to pay the fiduciary's checks without liability, unless it has actual knowl-
edge of a breach of trust or knowledge of facts amounting to bad faith.8 To
the extent that this provision relates to payments to third parties, Section 9
is merely a codification of the existing law; but the broad privilege to honor
checks drawn on a mixed account is seemingly not limited to third party
transactions. It is apparent from an examination of the Commissioner's
notes that the purport of the section is rather to include all checks drawn by
the fiduciary, even those payable to the bank itself.0
Although the intended scope of Section 9 seems reasonably clear, some
difficulty may be encountered in construing the language requiring as a basis
for liability actual knowledge of breach of trust or knowledge of facts
amounting to bad faith. Thus, in a recent case, a note brokerage firm, as
trustee, opened a special account in the defendant bank to pay the holders
of an issue of notes for which it was responsible. The account contained
$2,334,000, of which $635,000 was borrowed from the bank. The next morn-
ing, by a single check payable to its own order, the company transferred the
entire $2,334,000 to its regular account, thereby %viping out a recent over-
draft of $178,000.10 At the same time, a check was drawn on the regular
account, now containing only trust money, to repay the $635,000 loan, which
was not yet due. After the subsequent bankruptcy of the broker, a group
of the unpaid noteholders sued the bank for the $819,000 it had received
from the ear-marked fund. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
applying the case law rules, held the bank liable for the amount of the over-
draft.11 The payment of the loan, however, was held to fall within Section
7. 9 UxiroRm L ws ANN. (1932) 154.
8. The Fiduciaries Act has been enacted in fourteen states and the District of Co-
lumbia; two other states have passed it in garbled form. Id. at 146. Other statutes
similar to § 9 in purpose, but of varying scope, are ARr. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses,
Supp. 1927) § 716f; GEoRGIA CODE (1933) § 13-2042; Miss. CoDE (1930) § 382; Mo.
REv. STAT. (1919) § 996, 1 STAT. ANN. (1932) 730.
9. The Commissioners' notes indicate an intention to put a depository bank on the
same footing as other creditors. 9 UNTnax~ LAws Ain. (1932) 155. A payment from
the mixed account to a third party creditor would impose no liability on him, becamuse he
would have no notice of the trust. It was presumably intended that the bank should have
the same freedom. This construction is supported by the unqualified sense in which the
word pay is used elsewhere in the Act, and has been approved in (1933) 86 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 322, and (1938) 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 271; cf. (1938) 33 Cor.. L Ray. 495.
10. The overdraft was created on the same day that the loan was made and the
trust account opened, but it was not called to the attention of the bank's officers until
after the dose of business. See Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 92 F. (2d) 183, 186 (App.
D. C. 1937). The court held that the transfer of the funds to the personal account was
not per se a breach of trust. Id. at 195.
11. Two judges dissented on this point, arguing that § 6 of the Act should apply.
Section 6 provides that if a fiduciary draws a check payable to his own order, and trans-
fers it "whether in payment of a personal debt or otherwise," the transferee will be
1938]
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9, and, since the court found no actual knowledge or bad faith on the part
of the bank, the noteholders were denied recovery for that amount.
12
In the absence of guidance from the Act itself on the meaning of "actual
knowledge," the court decided that this term should be given the subjective
sense in which it is employed in Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. 3 The cases arising under this Section have generally held that actual
knowledge refers to the state of mind of the individual buying defective
paper. Unless he is actually aware of infirmities, he, and through him a cor-
porate principal, are usually treated as a holder in due course.14 Applied to
the instant case, the subjective test requires that some one individual in the
bank know that the payment was in breach of trust. It seems clear from
the evidence that no single person had such knowledge. The president and
vice-president, otherwise thoroughly conversant with the transaction, did not
know the source of the funds which paid the loan and overdraft. The teller,
the only person in the bank who was aware of the transfer, knew nothing
of the overdraft. The bookkeeper whose posting operation cancelled the
overdraft had only a deposit slip, which gave no indication of the source of
the deposit.15 Other participants in the transaction, insulated within eight
liable only if he has actual knowledge or bad faith. The check which transferred the
trust funds to the regular account and thereby paid the overdraft was in this form; but
commentators, as well as the court, have divided on the question of whether such a
"payment" falls within the ambit of § 6. See (1938) 51 HARv. L. REv. 563; (1938) 86
U. oF PA. L. Ray. 322. But see (1938) 23 WAsH. U. L. Q. 271; (1938) 38 COL. L. REV.
495. Section 6 provides a seemingly unwise escape from the case-law restraints, pre-
served in §§ 4 and 5, on the payment of personal debts with fiduciary paper. But its
application to the overdraft payment in the instant case seems logically unavoidable. See
(1935) 20 CORN. L. Q. 220, 224.
In view of the exhaustive treatment of § 6 and its relation to the overdraft in the above-
cited periodicals, it will receive no further attention in this note. It should be pointed
out, however, that the protection given the bank by §§ 6 and 9 applies only where over-
drafts and loans are paid by check-and in the overdraft case the check must be payable
to the fiduciary personally and endorsed to the bank. If it were drawn on the fiduciary
account payable directly to the bank, the bank would be liable. Uniform Fiduciaries Act,
§§ 7, 8. Even more adventitious, from the bank's point of view, is the fact that, if the
bank collected the loan by exercising its right of set-off, common law liability would
attach. See (1938) 38 COL. L. Ray. 495, 499. There would seem to be no significant
difference between payment by check and payment by set-off.
12. Colby v. Riggs National Bank, 92 F. (2d) 183 (App. D. C. 1937).
13. The court did not specifically refer to § 56 of the N. I. L., but its reasoning
leads to the same result. See Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 92 F. (2d) 183, 194-6 (App.
D. C. 1937).
14. First Denton Nat. Bank v. Kenny, 116 Md. 24, 81 At. 227 (1911); First Nat.
Bank of Glasgow v. Carroll, 46 N. D. 62, 179 N. W. 664 (1920) ; Chestnut St. Trust
& Say. Fund Co. v. Record Pub. Co., 227 Pa. 235, 75 At. 1067 (1910). But cf. Louisa
County Nat. Bank v. Burr, 198 Iowa 4, 199 N. W. 359 (1924) (knowledge of any man-
aging officer is knowledge of bank).
15. The check transferring the funds, which by its signature showed its fiduciary
origin, went through the proof department to be debited to the account on which it was
drawn; the deposit slip routed to the bookkeeper of the regular account stated only the
amount of the deposit. Statement of Evidence 84-85, Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 92 F.
(2d) 183 (App. D. C. 1937). The check and deposit slip would be similarly separated
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different departments of the bank, had only fragmentary information. 0
The liability sought to be abolished by Section 9 was that arising from
receipt of trust money from a mixed account complicated by subsequent
deposits and withdrawals, the theory being that there is no reasonable safe-
guard whereby the recipient bank may avoid responsibility.1" None of these
conditions were present in the principal case. Here the account in question
contained nothing but trust money, and the entire transaction occupied less
than twenty-four hours. At several points the misappropriation might have
been frustrated had it not been for the negligent deference of the vice-presi-
dent to an important customer.18 Furthermore, any sort of indication from
the receiving teller to the bookkeeper that the deposit consisted of fiduciary
funds should have sufficed to suspend payment of the overdraft and loan
until inquiry was made. Application of the subjective test to such a state
of facts puts a premium on negligence and permits a large bank to avoid
liability by subdividing and segregating its functions.10
Although the court's interpretation of the phrase "actual knowledge" was
undoubtedly that intended by the Commissioners of Uniform Laws,2 it is
not a necessary consequence of the wording of the act. A finding of corporate
knowledge, whether actual or constructive, is at best a fiction, for clearly the
corporation, itself, knows nothing; any knowledge for which it can be held
responsible must necessarily be imputed from its agents.2 To measure a
if the check were drawn on another bank. See New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Nat. Newark
& Essex Banking Co., 117 N. J. Eq. 264, 282, 175 AtL 609, 617 (Ch. 1934), af'd, 119
N. J. Eq. 540, 182 AUt. 824 (1936).
16. Statement of Evidence passim, Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 92 F. (2d) 183 (App.
D. C. 1937).
17. Scott, loc. cit. supra note 6.
18. For example, while the arrangements about opening the trust account were
being made, the president of the note brokerage company presented at the city collection
window in payment of a note the check which overdrew the regular account $178,000.
The teller would have ascertained from the bookkeeper whether the check was good,
but the vice-president, by his own testimony, told him, "Just take that. That is all right."
Statement of Evidence 80, Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 92 F. (2d) 183 (App. D. C. 1937).
The president of the note company was a director of the bank. Id. at 96.
19. The size and complexity of an organization do not ordinarily allow it to escape
responsibility; the same standards should apply, other things being equal, to an individual
or to an impersonal entity. United States v. Nat. Exchange Bank of Baltimore, 270
U. S. 527 (1926). Compare First Nat. Bank of New Bremen v. Burns, 83 Ohio St. 434,
103 N. E. 93 (1913), with Brookhouse v. Union Pub. Co., 73 N. H. 363, 62 Adt. 219
(1905).
20. The Commissioners' notes make it clear that the adoption of the actual kmowledge
or bad faith formula throughout the Act vas designed to bring the negotiable instru-
ments transactions of fiduciaries into line with the general rules as to actual Imowledge
governing holders in due course. Fiduciary paper has long constituted a major excep-
tion, since it has been dealt with in terms of constructive kmowledge and notice. 9 Urn-
Fop LAws A~x. (1932) 151. Cf. Fidelity & Dep. Co. of Md. v. Atchison, T. & S. F.
Ry., 75 P. (2d) 283 (Kan. 1938).
21. See Solow v. General Motors Truck Co., 64 F. (2d) 105, 107 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933)
("fairyland of pure fiction"); Abbot, Notice to a Corporation from Entries on its Boobs
(1913) 26 HAxv. L. REv. 237, 238.
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corporation's actual knowledge by that of only one of its agents, is, there-
fore, a permissible but not a necessary rationalization. An equally plausible
hypothesis would be to gauge the knowledge of the corporate entity in terms
of the sum of the knowledge acquited in the course of their employment by all
of its agents. This "composite" knowledge22 has seldom been countenanced
in the negotiable instruments field,23 but has received some support in other
phases of the law. 4 The obvious advantage of the composite knowledge
doctrine is that it recognizes no distinction between large and small organiza-
tions. For instance, had this test been applied in the instant case, there can
be little doubt that the combined knowledge of the teller and the vice-presi-
dent would have sufficed to charge the batik with actual knowledge of the
breach of trust.25 Nor would a composite knowledge interpretation of Sec-
tion 9 do violence to the purpose of the Act. If the transactions involving
the trustee's personal account had concerned third parties and had extended
over a longer period of time,26 the sum total of all the knowledge possessed
22. See Neal v. Cincinnati Union Stock Yards Co., 1 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. (H.s.) 13
(1903).
23. See cases cited note 14, supra. But where a clerk had received notice of a stolen
bond which was later purchased by an officer of the bank who knew nothing of the notice,
the bank was charged with actual knowledge that the bonds were stolen, under § 56 of
the Negotiable Instruments Law. Northwestern Nat. Bank of Milwaukee v. Madison &
Kedzie State Bank, 242 Ill. App. 22 (1926). This, though a minority holding, seems
to be the better view. See Merrill, The Wages of Indifference (1936) 10 TEMP. L. Q.
147; but see (1936) 45 YAm.a L. J. 539.
Compare the cases holding banks liable for failure to observe a stop-payment order,
though these are usually rationalized on an implied-contract theory. See Moore, Suss-
man, and Brand, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to Orders to Stop Payment
of Checks (1933) 42 YAr L. J. 817, 844.
24. In an action for deceit, where it was necessary to show actual knowledge that
representations were false, the court held that the knowledge of a foreman was that of
the company, and that a belief in their truth by the managing officer who had made the
statements would be unavailing. Meader v. Trout Brook Ice & Feed Co., 96 Conn. 454,
114 Aft. 668 (1921). Accord: Operators Royalty & Producing Co. v. Greene, 173 Okla.
388, 4D P. (2d) 499 (1935). Where actual knowledge is not required, and notice or
constructive knowledge is sufficient, it is commonplace that a corporation is charged with
the knowledge of any of its agents acquired in the scope of their employment. 2 MEcHEr,
AGENCY (1914) § 1843. But in a case arising under the Fiduciaries Act, the court re-
pudiated the composite knowledge theory as a basis for a finding of bad faith. New Am-
sterdam Cas. Co. v. Nat. Newark & Essex Banking Co., 117 N. J. Eq. 264, 284, 175 Atl.
609, 618 (1934), aff'd, 119 N. J. Eq. 540, 182 At. 824 (1936) (history of misappropria-
tions far more complicated than in instant case).
25. Although the question would still remain as to whether the bank's composite
actual knowledge of the source of the money would constitute actual knowledge of the
breach of trust, as required by § 9, the court in the instant case seemed to have no doubt
that the bank would be liable if, under its subjective theory, one person had known of
the transfer of the funds and the payment of the loan. Colby v. Riggs Nat. Bank, 93 F.
(2d) 183, 194 (App. D. C. 1937).
26. Whether, under a composite knowledge rationalization, an agent's forgetfulness
of his component item of information would discharge the bank is not clear. See Merrill,
supra note 4, at 474.
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by the bank's various agents would have been insufficient to constitute actual
knowledge in the bank.27
But even though such an interpretation of the actual knowledge clause of
Section 9 would have obviated the possible inequity of the decision in the
instant case, the whole policy underlying this provision and the Uniform Fidu-
ciaries Act in its entirety may be open to serious question. Mixed accounts
are often used but are rarely necessary. If unrestrained, they constitute
an invitation to defraud, for in them trust funds lose all identity, enabling a
dishonest fiduciary to embezzle freely without arousing suspicion or inquiryPu
In the past the courts have been lenient enough with such accounts P' the
Fiduciaries Act goes further and attempts to destroy a liability which, indi-
rectly at least, tended to discourage their creation.20 The Act was predicated
upon the hypothesis that honest fiduciaries should be permitted greater free-
dom in handling trust money.31 In order to effectuate this end, some of its
provisions place the risk of occasional loss upon the beneficiaries of the trust
rather than upon those who deal with the dishonest trustee.32 If the equities
of the trustee's creditors were strong, such a shift of liability might be justi-
fied. I-t should be remembered, however, that a bank which extends credit
to one who is not only dishonest but probably insolvent would usually lose its
money in any event Consequently its equities in the embezzled funds seem
tenuous at best.a3
27. In this event no single agent or group of agents could have known the status of
the trustee's account. See notes 5-6 supra.
28. See Merrill, Bankers' Liability for Deposits of a Fiduciary to His Pcrsoral
Account (1927) 40 H.nv. L. Rzv. 1077 (advocating liability for all misappropriations
from mixed accounts).
29. This is true especially of the executor-administrator type of fidudary, who is
said to have complete dominion over the estate. Cocke's Adm'rs v. Loyall, 150 Va. 336,
143 S. E. 881 (1928). Agents of business units, however, are more often restricted in
their use of the firm's money, and banks have consequently been penalized for allowing
them to deposit it in personal accounts. Chase & Co., Inc. v. Norfolk Nat. Bank of
Commerce, 151 Va. 1040, 145 S. E. 725 (1928). But see Comment (1926) 35 Y.n L. J.
854.
30. N. Y. SunoGATEs' CouRts AcT § 231 makes it a misdemeanor for an executor,
administrator, or guardian to deposit trust money in a personal account. Cf. N. Y.
Laws 1927, c. 473, § 1, amending N. Y. NEzo'rxtu InsmuuENTs LAw § 95 (ban: need
not inquire into deposit of corporate funds in personal account by officer of corporation,
if it has filed authorization permitting such deposits).
31. 9 UmFORM LAws ANN. (1932) 148.
32. See, e.g., §§ 6, 9.
33. There is some authority for the proposition that, regardless of notice or knowl-
edge, the bank cannot retain trust money paid it from a personal account, unless "superior
equities" have arisen in its favor, as from an injurious change of position. Citizens' &
Southern Bank v. Fayram, 21 F. (2d) 993 (C C. A. 5th, 1927). But the weight of
authority seems to be contra. Arnold v. San Ramon Valley Bank% 184 Cal. 632, 194 Pac.
1012 (1921) ; see (1938) 38 CoL- I. REv. 495, 497.
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EFFECT OF ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME CLAUSE IN TRUST INDENTURE AND
SUPPLEMENTAL CONTRACT CONCERNING RENTS AND PROFITS *
DURING the recent depression the mortgagee-usually depicted as a bar-
gain driving money lender whose funds are well secured by the mortgaged
property-has found his security to be of uncertain value. The deflation of
real estate values in periods of economic stress has given rise to attempts to
"milk" mortgaged property by mortgagors desirous of obtaining all possible
revenue before their equities are extinguished.1 Moreover, legislation aimed
at staying foreclosures 2 and at protecting the mortgagor against deficiency
judgments, also a product of the depression, has accentuated the tendency to
lend mortgage money in reliance upon the income of the property rather than
the financial ability of the borrower to repay.3 Together, these phenomena
make it extremely important to mortgagees that full effect be given to the
"assignment of rents" clause commonly found in mortgage deeds. It has long
been conventional doctrine that a clause in a mortgage conveying rents and
profits is to be construed as a pledge, to be perfected only when the mortgagee
takes possession, actually or constructively by securing the appointment of
a receiver ancillary to foreclosure. 4 But a strict standard of accountability
for the fair rental value of the property and liability for waste and misman-
agement make the position of the mortgagee in possession rather hazardous.
5
And although securing the appointment of a receiver may be made easier
when the mortgage pledges rents and profits than otherwise,0 this proceed-
ing is slow, expensive,7 often inefficient, and usually results in foreclosure at
an inopportune time and at a heavy capital loss. Consequently, it is not sur-
prising that mortgagees should seek other methods of dealing with default-
ing mortgagors which would enable the former to obtain control of the in-
come of the property and yet avoid the liability and expense entailed by the
conventional devices.
A recent case illustrates the hazards in which such an attempt may involve
the mortgagee. To secure a bond issue, a deed of trust was executed mort-
* Fisher v. Norman Apartments, Inc., 72 P. (2d) 1092 (Colo. 1937).
1. See Comment (1933) 46 HARV. L. REV. 491.
2. E.g., CONN. GE r. STAT. (1930) §§ 5083, 5116; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933)
§3-1801.
3. See Abelow, An Historical Analysis of Assignments of Rent in New York (1936)
6 BRooLYN L. REv. 25.
4. American Bridge Co. v. Heidelbach, 94 U. S. 798 (1876) ; Freedman's Saving &
Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S. 494 (1888); Myers v. Brown, 92 N. J. Eq. 348, 112 Atl.
844 (Ch. 1921); New York Security & Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas & Elec. Light Co.,
159 N. Y. 137, 53 N. E. 758 (1899) ; 2 JONE.S, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 827.
5. See Comment (1935) 35 CoL L. REV. 1248.
6. Several cases hold that where rents and profits are pledged, it is not necessary
to show waste or impairment of the security in order to obtain a receiver. Howard v.
Bums, 201 IIl. App. 579 (1916) ; Ohio Mutual Savings & Loan Co. v. Public Construc-
tion Co., 26 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 371 (1926) ; see Rhinelander v. Richards, 184 App. Div.
67, 70, 171 N. Y. Supp. 436, 437 (1st Dep't 1918). Contra: Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Broecker, 166 Ind. 576, 77 N. E. 1092 (1906).
7. See Carey, Brabner-Smith, and Landsen, Studies in Foreclosures in Cook Counly
(1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 475, 595, 717, 849.
gaging real estate and assigning the rents and profits of the property. Upon
default a bondholders' protective committee was organized. It entered into
an agreement with the corporate mortgagor whereby the income from the
property was to be deposited in a named bank, subject to check by the joint
signatures of an agent of the protective committee and the resident manager
of the property, as agent for the debtor. After payment of operating
expenses, the residue was to be paid to the trustee under the indenture, who
was to apply it upon the indebtedness. Subsequently a creditor of the
mortgagor, who had obtained a judgment against it prior to the execu-
tion of this contract, attempted to garnish the bank with which the funds
had been deposited, and the trustee intervened, claiming title to the moneys
under both the original indenture and the subsequent agreement. A judg-
ment for the intervenor was reversed by the Supreme Court of Colorado,
one judge dissenting, upon the grounds, first, that there had been insufficient
action by the mortgagee to make the assignment clause in the indenture oper-
ative, and second, that the contract could not be construed as a direct assign-
ment of rents to the mortgagee.
8
Although income not yet in being is, in effect, after-acquired property, the
difficulties inherent in a rationalization of the legal theory of a mortgage on
after-acquired property9 are rarely encountered in cases discussing the valid-
ity and effect of clauses granting or assigning income.10 The difficulty is
rather that construing the clause granting rents and profits to be an inchoate
or executory pledge entails as a corollary the application of the rule that
possession of the property must be taken to render the pledge effective. It
has long been held that where a mortgage uses words conveying or pledg.
ing the rents and profits, the mortgagee is entitled to them only when he
takes actual possession or secures the appointment of a receiver.n However,
where, as in the instant case, words of assignment are used, there is no such
unanimity of opinion. Under one view no distinction is made between an
"assignment" and a "pledge," and the general rule is applied to both.1 2 In
some jurisdictions this result has been justified by reliance on statutes pro-
viding that a mortgagor shall retain possession of the property until fore-
closure and sale.13 But the conventional doctrine has been expressly rejected
8. Fisher v. Norman Apartments, Inc., 72 P. (2d) 1092 (Colo. 1937).
9. See generally, Blair, The Allocation of After-Acquircd Mortgag d Property
Among Rival Claimants (1926) 40 Himv. L. REv. 222, 224 et scq.; Foley and Pogue,
After-Acquired Property Under Conflicting Corporate Mortgage Irdentures (1929) 13
MiNyf. L. Ray. 81, 82 et seq.
10. But a grant of income has been held invalid as an attempt to mortgage after-
acquired property in violation of statute. Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Barton, 101 Ga. 466,
28 S. E. 842 (1897) ; Lubroline Oil Co. v. Athens Saving Bank, 104 Ga. 376, 30 S. F_.
409 (1898).
11. See cases cited supra note 4.
12. In re Israelson, 230 Fed. 1000 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); In re Derdid; 56 F. (2d)
288 (S. D. N. Y. 1931) ; Sullivan v. Rosson, 223 N. Y. 217, 119 N. F_. 405 (1918) ; One
Hundred Forty-Eight Street Realty Co. v. Conrad, 125 Misc. 142, 210 N. Y. Supp. 400
(Sup. Ct 1925).
13. Orr v. Bennett, 135 Minn. 443, 161 N. NV. 165 (1917) ; Smith v. Grilk, 64 N. D.
163, 250 N. IV. 787 (1933); Rives v. Mincks Hotel Co., 167 Olk. 500, 30 P. (2d) 911
(1934).
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in several jurisdictions. Thus, where the assignment of rents was solely for
the payment of taxes, insurance premiums, and repairs, the clause was said to
become operative upon default since the mortgagor's failure to pay them was
waste.14 Another case, which holds that the mortgagor's assent to the pay-
ment of rents to the mortgagee brought the assignment clause into operation,
suggests that the general rule is applicable only when the mortgagor resists
the claim of the mortgagee.15 Moreover, some courts have relied upon a
statute validating the assignment of rents and profits to hold that an assign-
ment clause transfers title upon default.' 6 Other courts have reached the
same result without the aid of statutes,'1 and require neither the taking of
possession nor judicial action by the mortgagee to defeat the claims of gar-
nishing creditors of the mortgagor.18  And where no distinction is made
between pledge and assignment, it has been intimated that a demand for pos-
session followed by refusal will operate to enforce the mortgagee's claim.19
In view both of this possibility even under the stricter rule and of the ten-
dency of numerous recent cases to construe an assignment in a trust deed to
be self-executing upon default, it would seem that the mortgagee in the instant
case took sufficient affirmative action to entitle him to a position superior to
that of a garnishing creditor.20
Aside from the question of whether the contract in the instant case made
the assignment clause in the trust indenture operative, the contract itself
might be considered a valid assignment. But the court maintained that the
contract could not be so construed since the word "assign" did not expressly
appear and since the mortgagor, through its agent, remained in physical pos-
session of the property. However, the rule that no particular form of words
or instrument is necessary to constitute an assignment is of long standing.
21
14. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. West, 178 Minn. 150, 226 N. W. 406 (1929);
Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co. v. Canby Inv. Co., 190 Minn. 144, 251 N. W. 129 (1933).
15. Farmers' Union Jobbing Ass'n v. Sullivan, 137 Kan. 196, 19 P. (2d) 476 (1933).
16. Security Trust Co. v. Sloman, 252 Mich. 266, 233 N. W. 216 (1930); Abrin v.
Equitable Trust Co., 271 Mich. 535, 261 N. W. 85 (1935). The statute is Micg. CotiP.
LAWs (1929) § 13498.
17. Paramount Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Sacks, 107 N. J. Eq. 328, 152 Atl. 457 (Ch.
1930) ; Stanton v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 345, 152 At. 653 (Ch. 1930);
New Jersey Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Wolf, 108 N. J. Eq. 412, 155 Atl. 372 (Ch. 1931);
New Jersey Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Morris, 155 Atl. 782 (N. J. Ch. 1931).
18. Granniss-Blair Audit Co. v. Maddux, 167 Tenn. 297, 69 S. W. (2d) 238 (1934).
19. See Dow v. Memphis & L. R. R. R., 124 U. S. 652, 654 (1888); Freedman's
Saving & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S. 494, 503 (1888) ; One Hundred Forty-Eight
Street Realty Co. v. Conrad, 125 Misc. 142, 145, 210 N. Y. Supp. 400, 403 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
A demand for possession has been held to effectuate an equitable assignment of rents to
the mortgagee. Katz v. Goodman, 136 Misc. 166, 238 N. Y. Supp. 700 (Sup. Ct. 1929);
First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Adams, 218 Wis. 406, 261 N. W. 16 (1935).
20. Not only were the rents on deposit with the bank subject to release only upon
the counter-signature of the mortgagee's agent, but the agreement further provided that
the mortgagor could incur no unusual or extraordinary expenses without the written
consent of the bondholders' committee, and the latter were empowered to exercise con-
trol over the eviction of tenants and to bring suit in the mortgagor's name if necessary
to collect rents or other accounts receivable.
21. Iowa Bridge Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 39 F. (2.d) 777 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930)
Galbreath v. Wallrich, 45 Colo. 537, 102 Pac. 1085 (1909) ; Porter v. Title Guaranty &
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And although under the usual agreement assigning rents the mortgagee does
take possession of, and manage, the property,2 there is authority that the
retention of possession by the mortgagor is not inconsistent with a valid as-
signment. Agreements under which the mortgagor remained in possession,
and under which collection of rents was by an agent of the mortgagee3 or
by an agent of the mortgagor 24 have been held effective to enforce the for-
mer's lien. Under an agreement whereby the mortgagor collected the rents
as trustee and remitted the excess over operating expenses to the mortgagee,
an attempted garnishment of rents in the hands of tenants was held to be in-
effectual, the court stating that since the parties were acting by mutual con-
sent and cooperation, the mortgagee was to all intents and purposes in pos-
session of the property and a valid assignment had been effected2-reasoning
which would seem to be peculiarly adaptable to the instant case. Moreover,
the requirement that the mortgagee must actually be in possession to effect
an assignment has been expressly repudiated by one court, which held that the
relative rights of the parties were to be determined by their agreement and
not by the fact of possession.26 The court in the principal case, however,
apparently felt that the mortgagee must be in complete control of the prop-
erty before any agreement of the parties could operate to effectuate his lien-
a result which reads into the subsequent agreement all the strict prerequi-
sites to the operation of the assignment clause in the original indenture.
The decision in the instant case also seems open to question on other
grounds. In the first place, since the federal court in prior bankruptcy pro-
ceedings of this debtor had treated the mortgagees title to the rents as not
open to question,"7 it would seem that the plaintiff, who was a party to those
proceedings, might well be precluded from suing on the theory of res judi-
cata. Secondly, since the contract was binding between the immediate parties
and would consequently prevent the mortgagor from recovering the rents for
its own use, the decision apparently violates a settled rule of Colorado law
that a garnishing creditor can recover from the garnishee no more than could
Surety Co., 21 Idaho 312, 121 Pac. 548 (1912); Wheless v. Meyer & Schmid Grocer
Co., 140 Mo. App. 572, 120 S. NV. 703 (1909).
22. See e.g., Reichert v. Guaranty Trust Co., 261 Mich. 315, 246 N. IV. 132 (1933);
Mfass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 278 Mich. 457, 270 N. NV. 743 (1936).
23. Netzeband v. Knickmeyer-Fleer Realty & Inv. Co., 103 S. IV. (2d) 520 (Mo.
App. 1937).
24. Dailey v. Doherty, 237 Mass. 365, 129 N. _. 678 (1921).
25. Kershaw v. Squier, 137 Kan. 855, 22 P. (2d) 463 (1933); cf. Hall v. Golds-
worthy, 136 Kan. 247, 14 P. (2d) 659 (1932) (agreement between mortgagor and mort-
gagee that third party should collect and hold rents until rights of the parties were judi-
dally determined vested title to rents so held in mortgagee).
26. Farmers' Trust Co. v. Prudden, 84 Minn. 126, 86 N. NV. 837 (1901). In Bank
of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Memphis, 155 Tenn. 63, 290 S. NV. 990 (1927), where the
parties stipulated in the trust indenture that all income wras to be deposited in a named
bank subject to withdrawal only by an authorized agent of the mortgagor for certain
specified purposes, it was held that this agreement operated to vest control and possession
of the income in the mortgagee even before default.
27. Morrison v. Rockhill Improvement Co., 91 F. (2d) 639 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937).
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the primary debtor himself.28 Finally, there is no compelling reason why thu
courts should not favor the claims of a mortgagee who wishes to avoid the
expense of a receivership and still not be deprived of the security of the
rents.2 9 Not only is it desirable that the mortgagee should be able to rely
on available funds in the order of his priority over general creditors, but
such an attitude would also be in harmony with policy of recent sttutes delay-
ing foreclosure proceedings and preventing deficiency judgments. The instant
decision effectively precludes such a solution, invites a creditor's race imme-
diately upon default, gives the plaintiff a preference over all other creditors
both old and new who have contributed capital in reliance upon the contract,
and leaves no alternative but receivership.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO STOCKHOLDER'S
DERIVATIVE SUIT *
THE HYBRID nature of the stockholder's derivative suit1 makes it difficult
to select the appropriate limitation upon an action of this type.2 Since the
right enforced is that of the corporation, the stockholder's cause of action
is cognizable only in equity. Hence a number of courts have held that the
Statute of Limitations applicable to actions strictly equitable in character
must govern the derivative suit.8 But even though the suit is technically an
equitable proceeding brought in the stockholder's name, the real party in
interest is the corporation itself, for, in the event of recovery, it alone is
entitled to the award. 4 Consequently, the majority opinion has been that the
relationship of the parties is in itself unimportant and, that the limitation
period applied should be the one which would have controlled had the cor-
poration brought the suit.5 Yet some argument may be made for the minor-
ity view. Thus, the application of the equitable statute is consistent with the
28. Universal Fire Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 16 Colo. 531, 27 Pac. 890 (1891); State of
Colo. v. Elkins, 84 Colo. 409, 270 Pac. 875 (1928); Collins v. Thuringer, 92 Colo. 433,
21 P. (2d) 709 (1933).
29. See Comment (1933) 43 YALE L. J. 107.
*Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937).
1. For a discussion of the formal steps required of the stockholder in bringing a
derivative action, see Comment (1931) 15 MimN. L. Rsv. 453.
2. Some states, however, have no equitable Statute of Limitations, and consequently
the problem is whether to apply the legal bar or the doctrine of laches.
3. Verner v. Central Trust Co. of N. Y., 204 Fed. 779 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913);
Backus-Brooks Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 21 F. (2d) 4 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; cf. Green-
field Savings Bank v. Abercrombie, 211 Mass. 252, 97 N. E. 897 (1912).
4. Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312 (1916) ; see 13 FMcHE, CoroRnA-
Tions (Perm. ed. 1931) § 6028. There are exceptions to this rule. Di Tomasso v.
Leverro, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N. Y. Supp. 912 (2d Dep't 1937), (1937) 51 HAuv. L.
REv. 164 (the plaintiff was allowed to recover damages as he was the only innocent
stockholder).
5. Wallace v. Lincoln Savings Bank, 89 Tenn. 630, 15 S. W. 448 (1891). And
see cases cited in SrEvzrs, CoaroAxrloNs (1936) § 152.
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fact that in some states the plaintiff stockholder is deprived of his right to a
jury trial in a derivative suit.6 Furthermore, a strong case can be made for
the minority view simply because the equitable Statute of Limitations is
generally longer than the legal one. The autocratic control exercised by
directors over corporate affairs places dishonest directors in a peculiarly
advantageous position to prevent discovery of their wrongs. So long as they
constitute a majority of the board of directors, it is obvious that the corpora-
tion will never bring the suit.7 And even when the management changes
hands, the complicated nature of corporate accounts may prevent an imme-
diate disclosure of the irregular acts. In such event, the corporation may be
unable to sue until the statutory period has passed; and therefore the appli-
cation of the equitable Statute of Limitations to the stockholder's suit may
be desirable since it does allow a longer period in which recovery may be
had by the corporation through the process of the derivative suit.
The problem of selecting the statutory bar for these actions vras cogently
presented by a recent case. Plaintiff, a stockholder of the Pan American
Petroleum and Transport Company, brought a derivative suit in June, 1933,
against the directors of that corporation for acts cormnitted by them as such
during the years 1924 and 1925. The relief demanded was twofold: first,
an accounting of losses incurred by the corporation and profits obtained by
certain of the directors as a result of various complicated transactions whereby
these directors wrongfully appropriated funds belonging to the Pan American
Company for the purpose of purchasing in their own name stock of that and
another corporation ;8 secondly, damages for negligence against other direc-
tors who had not participated in the above transactions but who had approved
or acquiesced in these and other illegal acts.0 The defendants moved to dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the six year
Statute of Limitations which applies to all contractual obligations and injuries
to property. 10 The court of Special Term granted this motion, dismissing
6. Bookbinder v. Chase National Bank, 244 App. Div. 650, 280 N. Y. Supp. 393
(1st Dep't 1935) (holding that § 61 of the N. Y. GET. CoRP. LAw, which permits a jury
trial for the legal issues in a suit brought by a corporation against the directors on legal
and equitable causes of action, does not apply to the derivative suit).
7. Cf. Beal v. Smith, 46 Cal. App. 271, 189 Pac. 341 (1920).
8. The first cause of action of the third amended complaint alleged a complicated
conspiracy whereby certain of the directors purchased the stock of X Co. in the name
of Pan American. They then deposited the purchase price with a dummy corporation,
later applying the money so deposited to the purchase of Pan American stock in their
own names.
The seventh cause of action alleged the formation of a "director's syndicate" for the
purpose of engaging in various stock transactions with money supplied by Pan American
and thus acquiring certain stock held by Pan American in another corporation. See
Record pp. 116, 168, Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937).
9. The fourth cause of action alleged negligence against the defendants in having
approved a gift of $150,000 by Pan-American, to one Robert AV. Stewvard, Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Standard Oil and a director of Pan-American. The gift
was alleged to be ultra vires and a waste of corporate funds. Record, p. 185, Potter v.
Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937).
10. N. Y. C. P. A. § 48 [since amended, N. Y. Laws, 1936, c. 558].
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all counts against the directors." The Appellate Division affirmed the dis-
missal of the causes of. action charging negligence but reversed as to the
rest,12 holding that although the apposite Statute of Limitations was the one
which would have applied if the corporation had sued, the request for an
accounting was a demand for equitable relief and must, therefore, be gov-
erned by the ten year period of limitations applicable to actions of this type.1 3
The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision in its entirety, 4 thus overruling
previous dicta and several lower court decisions which had expressed a con-
trary view.' 5
Once the court had adopted as its premise the proposition that the stock-
holder's derivative suit is to be bound by the same Statute of Limitations
which would govern a suit by the corporation, it followed that the cause of
action based on negligence was outlawed, since the only possible action by the
corporation was legal in form.16 But the problems incurred by the request
for an accounting in equity present some difficulty, for the corporation had a
remedy at law. 17 And it is well settled that when concurrent legal and equit-
able remedies exist, equity will consider itself bound by the legal Statute of
Limitations.' 8 The court in the instant case refused to apply this rule, how-
ever, predicating its refusal upon the alleged inadequacy of the plaintiff's
remedies at law.19 This restriction upon the concurrent remedy theory rep-
11. Potter v. Walker, 159 Misc. 339, 287 N. Y. Supp. 806 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
12. Potter v. Walker, 293 N. Y. Supp. 161 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1937).
13. N. Y. C. P. A., § 53: "An action, the limitations of which is not specifically
prescribed in this article, must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action
accrues." This section applies to every form of equitable action. Pitcher v. Sutton, 238
App. Div. 291, 264 N. Y. Supp. 488 (4th Dep't 1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 638, 191 N. E.
603 (1934).
14. Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937).
15. Chance v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N. Y., 164 Misc. 346, 298 N. Y. Supp. 17
(Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd, 251 App. Div. 855, 297 N. Y. Supp. 293 (2d Dep't 1937); see
Brinckerhoff v. Bostwick, 99 N. Y. 185, 193, 1 N. E. 663, 667 (1885) (This case has
been the source of most of the confusion in New York).
16. The statute begins to run from the date of the negligent act, and not from the
date that the full extent of the injury is ascertained. Dyknan v. Keeney, 154 N. Y. 483,
48 N. E. 894 (1897); Brown v. Tenn. Coal Co., 19 Tenn. App. 123, 83 S. W. (2d)
568 (1935). A different rule applies where there is a fraudulent concealment of the
cause of action. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation (1933)
31 MICH. L. REV. 875.
17. See note 25, infra.
18. Heard v. Houston Gulf Gas Co., 78 F. (2d) 189, 191 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935);
Kelley v. Woodley, 228 Ala. 401, 153 So. 745 (1934); Backus v. Kirsch, 264 Mich. 73,
249 N. W. 469 (1933); Keys v. Leopold, 241 N. Y. 189, 149 N. E. 828 (1925); Hotch-
kin v. McNaught-Collins Imp. Co., 102 Wash. 161, 172 P. 864 (1918).
19. See Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 26, 11 N. E. (2d) 335, 336 (1937). But
cf. 1 POMEROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE § 139 ("The fact that the legal remedy is not
full, adequate, and complete, is, therefore, the real foundation of the concurrent branch
of the equity jurisprudence.")
It is arguable that the application of the equitable statute is consistent with the fact
that the plaintiff loses his right to a jury trial in an accounting action. Whiton v.
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resents2" a substantial variation from the doctrine that the mere existence of
a legal cause of action, however inadequate, will suffice. 2' Indeed, the com-
parative sufficiency of the alternative remedies appears to have been discussed
principally in those cases where the courts have applied the legal Statute of
Limitations, stating obiter dicta that the remedy at law was perfectly ade-
quate.22 Moreover, it is by no means clear that the legal remedies open to
the plaintiff in the instant case were as, unsatisfactory as the court seems to
have assumed. Although courts of equity first took jurisdiction over suits
for an accounting because of the inadequacy of the common law action of
account,23 this extension of the chancellor's jurisdiction soon resulted in a
general liberalization of the equivalent procedure at law to meet the increas-
ing competition of equity.2 4 It is, therefore, possible that an action for money
had and received 25 coupled with a pre-trial discovery 0 would have enabled
the plaintiff to recover the profits made by the directors without resorting to
Spring, 74 N. Y. 169 (1878); In re Doherty's Estate, 155 Misc. 396, 279 N. Y. Supp.
401 (Surr. Ct 1935). See supra, p. 1004.
20. The court relied upon the decisions in Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Morse
Dry Dock & Repair Co., 270 N. Y. 86, 200 N. E. 589 (1936) (although the plaintiff
had no available remedy at law, the court adopted similar language in order to refute
the argument that the plaintiff insurance company had a valid defense if sued at law),
and Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N. Y. 199, 135 N. F. 243 (1922) (which merely held that
the inadequacy of the legal remedy entitled the plaintiff to sue in equity for an account-
ing).
21. Hart v. Goadby, 72 Misc. 232, 129 N. Y. Supp. 892 (Sup. Ct 1911); City of
Milwaukee v. Drew, 220 Wis. 511, 265 N. NV. 683 (1936) ; see Minion v. Warner, 238
N. Y. 413, 418, 144 N. E. 665, 666 (1924).
22. See Butler v. Johnson, 111 N. Y. 204, 213, 18 N. E. 643, 645 (188); Holt v.
Hopkins, 63 Misc. 537, 541, 117 N. Y. Supp. 177, 180 (Sup. Ct 1909).
23. 4 PomE RO, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1420.
24. See Sloane v. United Feature Syndicate, 135 Misc. 365, 366, 238 N. Y. Supp.
91, 93 (N. Y. City Ct. 1929).
Consequently courts of equity have tended to limit their jurisdiction in accounting
actions to situations where a fiduciary relationship exists. See Sloane v. United Feature
Syndicate, 135 Misc. 365, 367, 238 N. Y. Supp. 91, 94, (N. Y. City Ct 1929). Where
there is a fiduciary relationship, an accounting will be granted as a matter of right
[Royal Indemnity Co. v. Knott, 101 Fla. 1495, 136 So. 474 (1931)], and the defense
that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law will not prevail [United States Trust
Co. v. Greiner, 124 Misc. 458, 209 N. Y. Supp. 105 (Sup. Ct. 1925) ]. An accounting may
also be based on the need of a discovery or on the complicated nature of the accounts.
4 Pom-moy, EQurrY JuispRuDENcE, § 1421.
25. Cf. McClure v. Law, 161 N. Y. 78, 55 N. E. 388 (1899). Such an action may
be maintained for the recovery of secret profits. Portsmouth Cotton Oil Corp. v. Fourth
Nat. Bank of Montgomery, 280 Fed. 879 (M. D. Ala. 1922), aff'd, 24 Fed. 718 (C. C. A.
5th, 1922) (holding that an action for money had and received is governed by equitable
principles and may be brought "where one party has received money which in equity
and good conscience belongs to another"). And see Su'rpAx;, Commo. LAW PLEADING
(3d ed. 1923) 162.
26. Cf. Bradford v. Indiana Harbor Belt R.R, 300 Fed. 78 (C. C.A. 7th, 1924).
The right to a discovery in an action at law is entirely statutory. See N. Y. RUL.s
OF CIVIL PRACTICE, 140, 141.
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the remedy in equity. 7 But by refusing to apply the shorter Statute of
Limitations to the suit against the active directors in the instant case the
court avoided the clearly undesirable result of preventing any recovery by
the corporation.
The very fact that the plaintiff encountered these difficulties in main-
taining his suit illustrates the inadequacy of present rules of limitation gov-
erning actions of this type. So long as the determination of the appropriate
Statute of Limitations depends upon the arbitrary distinction between legal
and equitable cause of action, the duration of directors' liability is largely a
matter of chance. Specific statutory amendments would seem to afford the
only practical solution to the problem. For instance, the legislature might
recognize the facility with which corporate directors may conceal their wrong-
ful acts, and specifically provide that in suits against directors, whether
brought by the corporation itself or its stockholders, the cause of action shall
not accrue until the corporation has knowledge of the wrong. An amendment
of this kind would have its counterpart in the statutory provision relating
to actions sounding in fraud, for in such actions the Statute of Limitations
does not start to run until the fraudulent act has been brought to light.2 8
But the court would still be faced with the difficult problem of determining
when the corporation has notice of the breach. While there is authority in
the fraud cases for holding that the corporation receives notice and that the
cause of action accrues upon the election of one new director,29 the better
decisions hold that the statute does not begin to run until the defendant di-
rectors no longer compose a majority of the board of directors.8 0 Yet even
under this view it is possible that neither the new directors nor the stock-
holders will discover the cause of action before the period of limitations has
run against them. To avoid this result, it would be necessary to require that
actual notice of the wrongful acts, as distinguished from constructive notice,
be received by the officers and stockholders. A second and more drastic meth-
od of obviating the difficulties facing the plaintiff in the instant case would
27. Cf. The Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. Fox, Inc., 245 N. Y. 215, 156 N. E. 670
(1927).
28. E.g., N. Y. C. P. A. 48(5). See generally Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment
and Statutes of Limitation (1933) 31 Mir. L. REv. 875. The plaintiff in the instant
case strenuously contended that the actions of the directors were tantamount to a fraud
upon the corporation [Answer Brief for Plaintiff, p. 25, Potter v. Walker, 276 N. Y.
15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937)], but the Court of Appeals did not mention this argument
in its opinion, either because it did not consider the gravaman of the action to be fraud
or because no showing of fraud had been made. Cf. Carr v. Thompson, 87 N. Y. 160
(1881).
29. Anderson v. Gailey, 33 Fed. (2d) 589 (N. D. Ga. 1929). In the instant case
it is barely possible that the court, though considering the action as one sounding in
fraud, adopted this view, since one new director was appointed more than six years
before the institution of the suit [Answering Brief for Defendants, p. 26, Potter v.
Walker, 276 N. Y. 15, 11 N. E. (2d) 335 (1937)]. Such a holding would be in keeping
with the fact that limitation statutes are usually accorded a strict interpretation [Pietsch
v. Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647, 101 N. W. 388 (1905)].
30. Beal v. Smith, 46 Cal. App. 271, 189 P. 341 (1920).
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be to abolish the defense of limitations in actions of this type. South Da-
kota has already taken a step in this direction.3'
Although there would seem to be no objection to the above amendments
in actions against directors which are brought by the corporation itself, it may
be argued that neither should apply to the stockholder's suit. The notion has
long been prevalent that most derivative actions are in the nature of "strike
suits,"' 32 instigated by an individual stockholder anxious to achieve a personal
settlement with the directors. And since the unwarranted compromise of a
derivative suit may prejudice the corporation's cause of action,-s it has been
felt that the stockholder's remedy should be hedged about with all possible
restrictions.34 Extension of the present period of limitations would undoubt-
edly open up further opportunities for "strike suits." But the alleged evil
of such suits might be curbed by two measures. The plaintiff-stockholder
might be denied the right to terminate the suit unless permission is granted
by the presiding judge in his discretion. 35 And a fine or penalty might be
imposed upon stockholders attempting to secure personal benefit by bargain-
ing for a settlement. If some such precautionary measures were adopted, there
could be no objection to extending the period during which a derivative suit
might be brought. An amendment to this effect would have the additional
advantage of affording a healthy check upon the activities of directors.'a
CREDITOR'S LIABILITY FOR MISMANAGEMENT OF DEBTOR CORPORATION *
BANKER participation in the management of industrial and merchandising
borrowers has become an established method of providing security for "slow"
loans." The desired control is almost always obtained either as a condition to
the extension of additional credit or by a threat of suit on maturing obliga-
tions. 2 Often this control is merely negative in character;3 sometimes it is
31. S. D. Coupne= LAws (1929) § 8789, removing the statute of limitations as a
defense in suits against directors for the wrongful use of capital stock. For the various
types of limitation statutes enacted to govern suits against directors, see 3 FLuTcHm,
CORPORATIONS (Perm. Ed. 1931) § 1304.
32. See Comment (1934) 34 Cor. L. REv. 1308.
33. See (1934) 29 ILI- L. REv. 393.
34. See note 32, supra.
35. Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 154 P. 312 (1916).
36. The derivative suit has, however, been criticized as an ineffective method of
control over directors. Bulack, Stockholders Suits-A Possible Substitute (1937) 35
MiCHa. L REv. 597.
* In the Matter of Prima Co., U. S. Dist. Ct. N. D. of IlL F_. D., No. 63,923, July
14, 1937, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 14705.
1. DEwING, FINANCIAL PoLicy OF CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1926) 1133 ct seq.; Glea-
son, When the Banker Needs Help (1935) 131 BANEERS MAGAZINzE 459; Rude, Reorgari-
zation and Workout Problems (1931) 12 Buur- CAL. BANKRS Ass'I 105.
2. STxoNcx AND EiGExLERNEm, BANx LOAN MANAGEMENT (1930) 189; Rude, supra
note 1, at 124.
3. Undated resignations of the officers and directors are often handed over to be
used at the bank's option [Martin v. Peyton, 246 N. Y. 213, 158 N. E. 77 (1927)], per-
19381 NOTES 1009
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
advisory or supervisory.4 More frequently, however, the banks take over the
entire management for the period of the "workout" of the loan. For this
purpose some banks have maintained a "sick business" department; others
keep a "business doctor" or hire some experienced individual for each par-
ticular job; and still others employ management firms.6 Finally, a type of
control that accords more closely with recognized legal forms has also been
secured by means of creditors' committees or voting trusts whose trustees are
nominees of the creditor bank.
6
In view of the variety of enterprises over which a bank may assume con-
trol, it is not surprising that mismanagement should sometimes occur. But
attempts have rarely been made to place responsibility for such mismanage-
ment upon the creditor bank,7 and a recent decision is almost unprecedented
in finding such responsibility. A brewing company had borrowed heavily from
the defendant bank, giving as security its notes endorsed with the personal
guaranties of its officers. Although the company had incurred heavy losses,
prospects of repayment were considered good. Nevertheless, the banks threat-
ened to call the loans and sue on the notes and guaranties unless the manage-
ment was turned over to X. The debtor's board, after voicing strenuous objec-
tions, finally hired X. By the terms of the contract, X was to have complete
control of finances, production, sales, and personnel, subject only to the approv-
al of the banks, and he was to be discharged only with their consent. Through a
consistent course of gross mismanagement, this nominee rendered the debtor
hopelessly insolvent. In reorganization proceedings under Section 77B, the
trustee secured a judgment against the banks for all losses and diminution of
assets caused by their nominee's mismanagement. Two theories of liability
were advanced: (1) by the use of "undue influence" the banks obtained con-
trol of the debtor's business and hence were chargeable as trustees dc son
tort; (2) by assuming actual control of the debtor's assets the banks became
parties to the management contract as if they had signed it, and were liable
as principals for the losses caused by the mismanagement of their agent.8
sonal guaranties of the loans may be obtained from the officers [see Rude, supra note
1], or the company's stock may be pledged [Little & Ives Co. v. Acceptance Corp., 215
App. Div. 427, 213 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1st Dep't 1926)].
4. Efficiency experts may be hired to pass on routine matters [Stout, A Business
Specialist Advises Each Borrower (1937) 54 RAND MCNALLY BANKERS MONTHLY 524],
an officer of the bank may be placed on the board of directors [1 MORAWETZ, CORPORA-
TIONS (2d ed. 1886) 495], or a bank officer's signature may be required on the borrower's
checks [EBERSOLE, BANK MANAGEMENT (1935) 487].
5. DEWING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1146-1147; Gleason, supra note 1, at 460.
6. E.g., Irving Bank-Columbia Trust Co. v. Stoddard, 292 Fed. 815 (C. C. A. 1st,
1923) ; Bullivant v. First Nat. Bank of Boston, 246 Mass. 324, 141 N. E. 41 (1923). See
generally CUSHING, VOTING TRUSTS (1927) 33, 168; Dewing, Creditor's Committee Re-
ceiverships (1922) 1 HARv. Bus. REv. 31.
7. Explanation may perhaps be found in the facts that most of these suits arise only
upon insolvency, and that the large creditor bank through its domination of bankruptcy
and receivership proceedings is able to prevent such suits. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COleMISSION, REPORT ON PROTECTIVE & REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES (1936-7) PART I,
157, 243-329.
8. In the Matter of Prima Co., U. S. Dist. Ct. N. D. of Ill. E. D., No. 63988, July
14, 1937, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 4705, (1937) 32 ILL. L. REv. 365, (1938) 51 HARv. L.
REv. 551.
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Aside from the difficulty of proving the minimum prerequisites of any
theory of action-negligence, agency,10 and proximate cause-the trustee
in bankruptcy who attempts to impose liability upon a bank for its agent's mis-
management will have trouble in formulating a theory of liability. By assum-
ing control of a debtor corporation, a bank has occasionally rendered itself
liable as partner or co-principal on the debtor's contracts with third parties.'2
In a suit for mismanagement, there is apparently no duty, contractual or
fiduciary, owed directly to creditors or stockholders for whose breach they
may sue; managers as fiduciaries are said to owe their duty only to the cor-
poration.1 3 But both stockholders, through a derivative suit, and creditors
upon insolvency, through a trustee in bankruptcy or a receiver, may sue for
breach of this duty.' 4 Upon this theory the trustee might be allowed recovery
against the managing agent. But since both debtor and bank are equally re-
sponsible for the agent's acts, in a suit against the bank the trustee will run
afoul of the rule that co-principals are not liable to each other for the negli-
gence of their common agent.r Yet there is no need to extend to the creditor
in a suit for mismanagement the defenses available to a co-owner, for he is
being subjected to the duties of a manager rather than those of a "co-owner."' 1
9. Two factors make negligence difficult to prove: first, it consists of something
more than mere mistakes in judgment, 3 FLxEcnm, CoRPoaTIoNs (1931) § 1039; sec-
ondly, impending insolvency may justify actions a reasonable man would not take under
ordinary circumstances. But in the instant case there was ample evidence on which the
court could base its finding of negligence.
10. Ordinarily the agent's contract relations are only with the debtor, and plaintiff
must rely almost entirely on circumstantial evidence. See 1 Mzcarn., Aorta" (2d ed.
1914) § 300. But where contractual relations exist between the banks and their nominee,
as where the banks regularly employ a "business doctor" or keep a "sick business" de-
partment, agency could be easily established on the "lent servant" theory.
11. It may be difficult to show that losses were caused by the banks' negligence
rather than by the general economic depression or the debtor's own mistakes before the
banks assumed control. In the instant case this difficulty was avoided by a presumption
that losses were due to the banks' negligence. But the federal rule is apparently directly
contra. Warner v. Penoyer, 91 Fed. 587, (C. C. A. 2d, 1893); United States v. Stone
Cliff Coal & Coke Co., 6 F. Supp. 1 (S. D. W. Va. 1934).
12. Otoe County Nat. Bank v. Delany, 88 F. (2d) 238 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; Shaw-
nee Nat. Bank v. Purcell Wholesale Grocery Co., 34 Old. 34, 124 Pac. 603 (1912) ; John-
son Bros. v. Carter & Co., 120 Iowa 355, 94 N. W. 850 (1903).
13. Kelly v. Dolan, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Bailey v. Mosher, 63 Fed. 483
(C. C. A. 8th, 1894) ; BALLANTINE, COPORATIONS (1930) § 185. But cf. Minnis v. Sharpe,
198 N. C. 364, 151 S. E. 735 (1930), (1930) 8 N. C. L. REV. 459. See Comment (1935)
2 U. oF CHL L. R-v. 317.
14. See Glenn, The Stockholders Suit-Corporate and Indizidual Grievances (1924)
33 Y=u L. J. 580. Damages recoverable from officers for mismanagement are considered
assets of the corporation collectible for the creditors by the trustee in bankruptcy. BA.-
LANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1930) § 120.
15. Chapman Co. v. Dowling Hardvrare Co., 205 Ala. 586, 88 So. 748 (1921).
16. To hold the bank liable as co-owners, their participation must look like an act of
entrepreneurship involving profit-sharing. See Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Ad-
ministration of Risk (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 721. But in mismanagement suits it is enough
that the banks exercise control merely as a security device, so long as they can be identi-
fied as managers.
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Consequently, it might well be said that the banks were the actual managers
and could not escape liability by acting through an agent.
If legal doctrines must be stretched to allow a recovery upon this theory,
the courts might still impose liability upon the banks as constructive trustees
or trustees de son tort.17 Where it is obvious that no technical trust results,
the courts have often employed trust doctrine as a remedial device to impose
a duty upon one who takes possession and control of another's property.1 8
In fact, -this doctrine was used to impose liability on the creditor in Little &
Ives Co. v. Acceptance Corporation,'9 the single action of this type which has
heretofore been brought. But the case is not necessarily a guiding precedent.
For in that case, besides securing the appointment of its nominee as treasurer,
the creditor also obtained the registration in its own name of the debtor's com-
mon stock. The principal obstacle to recovery on this theory in the instant
case is the fact that the debtor retained the power to restore its own manage-
ment if the creditors' nominee proved unsatisfactory,20 for a constructive
trust is seldom raised in behalf of one who has consented to the wrong for
which he is attempting to hold the trustee.
21
This difficulty might, however, be avoided on several theories. In the first
place, creditors might enforce liability through a trustee in bankruptcy, de-
spite the debtor's consent to the nominee, although in very few situations
have creditors or a representative of creditors been allowed a recovery which
would be denied to the corporation.2 2 Secondly, if the banks' control was
obtained by the exercise of undue influence or duress, it might be said that
the debtor's consent was vitiated.23 Yet despite the instant court's apparent
reliance on this escape from the consent doctrine, it is quite generally con-
ceded that the threat of enforcing a legal obligation is not taking such unfair
advantage of the obligor as to amount to undue influence or duress.
24
Finally, the consent that would bar recovery is consent to the wrongful acts
rather than consent to the taking of control. While it might be argued that
acquiescence resulted from a failure to discharge the bank's nominee in the
instant case, the bank's strongly entrenched position was such assurance of
17. A person who intermeddles with and assumes the management of property with-
out authority becomes a trustee de son tort, liable for the damages occasioned by his
intermeddling. 1 PERRY, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (7th ed., 1929) § 245.
18. Morris v. Joseph, 1 W. Va. 256 (1886); Bailey v. Bailey, 67 Vt. 494, 32 Atl.
470 (1895); see 1 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §§ 11-38.
19. 215 App. Div. 427, .213 N. Y. Supp. 606 (1st Dep't 1926).
20. Although the debtor might be liable in damages, it could have fired X, since
equity will not grant specific performance of an employment contract unless it is coupled
with an interest. Lane Mortgage Co. v. Crenshaw, 93 Cal. App. 411, 269 Pac. 672 (1928) ;
Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 110. In the instant case the employment could be coupled
with an interest only if the banks were parties to the contract.
21. 4 BoGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 941; 2 POMEOmY, EQUITY JURISPRU-
DEN E (4th ed. 1918) §§ 818-820.
22. (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1229.
23. 2 POMERoY, op. cit. supra note 21, § 951.
24. French v. Shoemaker, 81 U. S. 314 (1871) ; Atkinson v. Allen, 71 Fed. 58 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1895); Connolly v. Bouck, 174 Fed. 312 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
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non-exercise of this power that no consent to the wrongful acts should be
implied. Support for this theory may be found in the court's statement in
the Little & Ives Company case, that a fiduciary duty arises whether the debtor
gave the creditor control because of confidence in the proposed management
or by reason of necessity and duress.2 5 And liability under analogous legal
relationships is imposed for mere control, even though yielded voluntarily.
For instance, a pledgee or bailee owes a duty to be reasonably careful in his
custody of the property ;26 and a mortgagee in possession is liable for waste
of his debtor's property caused by mismanagement.-? Moreover, there is a
growing tendency for the courts to deal with the controllers of management
as the management itself and subject them to the same fiduciary obligations.
Although this development in the law of corporate responsibility has been
applied principally to the "dominant stockholders,"2 there seems to be no
reason why the courts cannot reach the same result when the domination is by
a creditor.2 9
A further theory of liability is one founded upon the bank's participation
in the breach of a trust30 based upon the fiduciary relationship existing be-
tween directors and corporation at all times, and between directors and cred-
itors when the corporation is insolvent.31 Under this view, any acquiescence
of the directors that may be inferred from failure to use their power to dis-
charge the incompetent manager would not be imputed to the corporation so
as to bar a recovery by the corporate debtor.3m But there is the further diffi-
culty of finding a breach of trust. If the banks were merely exercising their
privilege of conditioning extension of their notes upon appointment of a
certain manager, there might well be no such breach. On the other hand,
if the threats of personal liability coerced the directors to act contrary to the
25. Little & Ives Co. v. Acceptance Corporation, 215 App. Div. 427, 428, 213 N. Y.
Supp. 606, 607 (1st Dep't 1926).
26. JoNEs, CoLLATEmRL SacurrmEs AND Pr.EDGEs (3rd ed. 1912) § 410; Cutler v.
Fitch, 231 App. Div. 8, 246 N. Y. Supp. 28 (4th Depot 1930) (the creditor, who secured
deposit of a majority of debtor's voting stock as condition of renewal of the loans, was
held liable as a pledgee for all mismanagement losses).
27. See Comment (1935) 35 CoL L. REv. 1248. Western banls have frequently bte.en
held liable for failing to exercise proper care of cattle which the borrower was required
to place in hands of the banles agent until his notes v,'ere paid off. Sutley v. Polk County
Bank, 162 finm. 118, 202 N. IV. 338 (1925); National Cattle Loan Co. v. Ward, 113
Tex. 312, 255 S. NV. 160 (1923); White City State Bank v. St. Joseph Stckyards Bank,
90 11o. App. 395 (1901).
28. Wheeler v. Abilene Nat. Bank Bldg. Co., 159 Fed. 391 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903);
Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining Co., 221 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); see Berle,
Non-Voting Stock & "Bankers' Control" (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 673.
29. See Southern Pacific v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 492 (1919); BE= AND MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPRATION AND PRIVATE PRoPERTY (1932) 238-240; see S. E. C. op. cit.
supra note 7, PAlr II, at 173-4.
30. See generally Scott, Participation in a Brcach of Trust (1921) 34 Hnv. L REV.
454.
31. 3 FrHcr , CoRROaATIoNs (2d ed. 1931) § 838; 15 id., at § 7386. Since at the
time of X's employment the debtor corporation was sufficiently insolvent to have availed
itself of a 77B reorganization, such a relationship existed in the instant case.
32. 4 BOGERT, Tausrs AND Tausm=s (1935) § 913.
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best interests of the company and solely to protect themselves, 3 or if the
directors divested themselves of complete control so as to make their act ultra
vires,3 4 there would be little difficulty in finding a breach of trust in which the
bank participated.
Upon broader grounds the decision in the instant case would seem desir-
able. Bankers should not necessarily incur any penalty for removing a
management in order to protect their security. But when such action entails
bank management of the debtor's entire business, it might well be accompanied
by an equivalent responsibility; for in many cases the banks will not 'have a
sufficient supply of experts capable of producing good management.3 5 Fur-
thermore, the bankers' self-interest is not necessarily an assurance that good
management will result. The banker's opportunities for reorganization prof-
iteering38 may easily make him indifferent to his management responsibility
and in some instances even desirous of driving the business into insolvency.81
Although the imposition of liability may cause the banker to discontinue loan
extensions and resort much sooner to bankruptcy and receivership proceed-
ings3 -- a result that may not be wholly undesirable-, 39 it is likely to drive
banks to the use of management corporations, 40 in the hope that these firms
may be regarded as independent contractors and thus insulate the banks alto-
gether from liability. Such a solution may be the best one possible, for it
would assure the employment of competent as well as financially responsible
personnel. 41
33. American Agricultural Chemical Co. v. Robertson, 273 Mass. 66, 172 N. E. 871
(1930).
34. Davis v. Flagstaff Silver Mining Co., 2 Utah 74 (1877) ; see BALLANTINE, CoR-
PORATioNS (1930) § 101.
35. Dewing, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1147; Gleason, supra note 1, at 460.
36. These opportunities are by no means insignificant. Once control of the manage-
ment has been obtained, the bank can ensure itself of domination over the reorganization
and the new corporation, the advantages of which are notorious. See S. E. C. op. cit.
supra note 7, PART II, at 11 et seq.
37. E.g., Willett v. Herrick, 242 Mass. 471, 136 N. E. 366 (1922) (jury verdict of
$10,000,000 against creditors for conspiracy to dispossess debtor of his business) ; Kono v.
Roeth, 237 App. Div. 252, 260 N. Y. Supp. 662 (1st Dep't 1932) ; Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. N. Y. & N. Ry., 150 N. Y. 410, 44 N. E. 1043 (1896). See generally Frankfurter
and Landis, Bankers and the Conspiracy Law (1925) 41 NEW REPuBuc 218.
38. DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY oF CORPORATIONS (3rd ed. 1934) 1268-1270.
39. See Cover, Business and Personal Failure and Readjustment in Chicago (1933)
3 U. CH. J. OF Bus. 106; Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1207.
40. See Gleason, supra note 1, at 461-2.
41. See Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life (1935) 2 U. Cm. L.
REV. 501.
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CONSTRUCTION OF "GUARANTY OF PAYMENT" WHERE PROMISEE IS ITSELF A
GUARANTOR OF THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION *
MARKET-SEVENTEENTH Streets Corporation, a subsidiary of Fox Theatres
Corporation, sought a loan of $1,800,000 on its bond and mortgage, and on
the lender's requirement, obtained a policy of guaranty of interest and prin-
cipal from the Philadelphia Company for Guaranteeing Mortgages. The Phila-
delphia Company, however, unwilling to issue its guaranty without security,
required a guaranty from Fox for payments of interest on the loan, taxes on
the mortgaged property, and premiums on the policy of guaranty. All the
agreements were executed on the same day, except Philadelphia's policy of
guaranty, which was issued to the creditor three days later. Market subse-
quently defaulted upon all its obligations, the default on interest and tax
payments amounting to $371,436.90.1 The mortgagee did not attempt, how-
ever, to foreclose or to hold the Philadelphia Company on its guaranty. The
only loss sustained by the latter was $30,134.06 which it had paid out on inter-
est and taxes, and $18,000 in defaults on premium payments. Both Fox and
the Philadelphia Company had meanwhile become insolvent. Receivers for
the Philadelphia Company filed a claim2 in the Fox receivership for
$389,436.90-the total amount of defaulted interest, taxes, and premiums.
The District Court allowed the claim for only $48,134.06-the amount of
premium defaults plus reimbursement for Philadelphia's payments on interest
and taxes.3 On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the order was upset,
and the full amount of the claim allowed.
4
Although Fox's three "guaranties" of payment of premiums, taxes, and
interest were combined in a single clause, the Circuit Court considered the
legal effect of each separately, for no single theory could apply to all alike.
Fox's guaranty of premiums fits readily into the category of an absolute guar-
anty of payment; on this obligation Philadelphia was the creditor of Market,
the principal debtor, whose payment on the due date was guaranteed by Fox
for the accommodation of the debtor. Under such a tripartite arrangement,
Philadelphia could sue Fox when the premiums were due without first pro-
ceeding against the principal debtor. 5 The court therefore found no difficulty
* Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, 91 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937).
1. This is a net amount. The defaults on interest and taxes totalled $445,962.71, but
pursuant to agreement, $74,525.81 collected in rents v.'as deducted from this figure. See
p. 4, Brief for Appellants, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, 91 F.
(2d) 907 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
2. The claim was originally filed by the Philadelphia Company before its receiver-
ship; thereafter the receivers filed an amended claim in which the operating trustee of the
reorganized company joined as co-claimant.
3. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, 15 F. Supp. 109 (S. D.
N. Y. 1936).
4. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, 91 F. (2d) 907 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937).
5. Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Thomas B. Mclntire, 168 App. Div. 139, 153 N. Y.
Supp. 437 (2d Dep't 1915); Schlesinger v. Schroeder, 210 NVis. 403, 245 N. NV. 666
(1933) ; ARNoLD, Su=RYsHIp AND GuARAT (1927) § 23; STEA ;s, Suamshn (4th
ed. 1934) § 61.
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in sustaining this part of the claim.6 The tax guaranty was wholly different,
because taxes were owed, not to the Philadelphia Company, but to the city.
Philadelphia Company was interested in their prompt payment not only to
avert an accelerated liability on its guaranty of principal7 but also to prevent
impairment of the mortgage security, which furnished assurance of reim-
bursement for any payments pursuant to its guaranty of principal and inter-
est. In allowing the total claim for taxes, the opinion contains no indication
whether or not Philadelphia Company shall retain anything in excess of the
amount necessary to reimburse itself for taxes paid; but there seems little
doubt that this balance is to be held for the taxing authorities.8
Fox's guaranty of interest raises the most perplexing problem. Payment
of this item was guaranteed by Philadelphia to the creditor, and by Fox to
Philadelphia. The issue on this point as presented by the arguments of coun-
sel was whether Fox's "guaranty" constituted an indemnity against loss, or
an indemnity against liability.9 If an indemnity against loss, Philadelphia
could recover only an amount sufficient to reimburse itself for sums pre-
viously paid out on interest.10 But if an indemnity against liability, Market's
total defaults on interest could be recovered." The court, in deciding upon
the latter interpretation, was influenced by several factors: (1) the failure
of the parties to differentiate between premiums and the other two guaran-
teed payments in the Fox contracts; (2) the confession of judgment clause
in the contract; and (3) the stipulation in Philadelphia's guaranty policy
that interest was to be payable within five days after default, whereas prin-
cipal was not to be payable until eighteen months after maturity-viewed in
conjunction with the fact that Fox "guaranteed" interest and not principal.' 2
6. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, 91 F. (2d) 907, 909
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
7. Under the bond and mortgage a thirty day default on interest or taxes gave the
mortgagee the option to declare the principal immediately due. Although Philadelphia
was not liable for taxes under its guaranty, it had in fact paid out $1,988 in taxes. See
p. 4, Brief for Appellants, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, 91 F.
(2d) 907 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
8. The taxing authorities might assert that the receivers for Philadelphia were
constructive trustees as to this portion of the recovery. Cf. City of Norfolk v. Norfolk
County, 120 Va. 356, 91 S. E. 820 (1917).
9. Although the words "indemnity against loss" or "indemnity against liability"
were not used in the contract, the terminology is by no means conclusive. The factual
relationship of the parties, the objects sought to be attained, and the circumstances sur-
rounding execution of this contract and the other contracts made at the same time, should
be considered. Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1053.
10. Moberly v. Leonard, 339 Mo. 791, 99 S. W. (2d) 58 (1936); ARNOLD, op. Cit.
supra note 5, § 73; Comment (1935) 24 CALIF. L. REv. 193.
11. McManus v. Tralles, 253 S. W. 406 (Mo. App. 1923); Churchill v. Hunt, 3
Denio 321 (N. Y. 1846) ; McGee v. Roen, 4 Abb. Pr. 8 (N. Y. 1856) ; 24 CALIF. L. REv.
193, at 194; Comment (1936) 50 HARv. L. REv. 93, at 95.
12. The court also relies somewhat on an analogy to reinsurance cases, in which
the relationship of reinsurer to reinsured has been construed generally as one of indem-
nification against liability. Allemannia Ins. Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 209 U. S. 326
(1908) ; Comment (1936) 50 HARv. L. REv. 93, at 95. But cf. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Md. v. Pink, 58 Sup. Ct. 162 (1937). Though the relationship of the creditor, Philadel-
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The first two considerations moved the court to decide that the parties in-
tended interest as well as premiums to be payable to Philadelphia the moment
any liability on its part should arise under its guaranty policy, with Fox con-
fessing judgment for the entire amount of the liability. The third factor was
relied upon as further assurance that-the Philadelphia Company's apparent
objective was to insure against the necessity of putting up its own money for
Market's defaults; for although Philadelphia had sufficient time to discharge
its liability for a default on principal, it needed assurance of funds to meet
interest payments promptly.
While the contract therefore seems dearly one of indemnification against
liability rather than against loss, there remains the important question of
whether the recovery awarded to the receiver for Philadelphia Company is
to be held for the benefit of its creditors or in trust for the mortgagee. By
omitting any reference to this point, the opinion seems to contemplate a dis-
tribution of the recovery to the creditors of Philadelphia Company. In that
event, the result is certain to be an inequitable one. If, on the one hand, the
mortgagee fails to file a claim in the Philadelphia receivership before the bar
date,13 the portion of the payment representing indemnification against liabil-
ity rather than reimbursement will pass as a gratuity to the other creditors
of Philadelphia.' 4 The possibility of this windfall at the expense of the cred-
itors of Fox and, perhaps, at the ultimate expense of the mortgagor,15 might
be avoided by a decree stipulating that in the event of the mortgagee's failure
to file a claim before the bar date, Philadelphia's recovery of interest in excess
of the amount necessary for its reimbursement be returned to the Fox re-
ceiver. If, on the other hand, the more likely situation is supposed, i.e., that
the mortgagee will present a claim against Philadelphia, an improper adjust-
ment of the burden of loss will probably still result. Though it is possible
that even after Philadelphia became insolvent the mortgagee might have
obtained the full amount of Philadelphia's claim against Fox for defaulted
interest by seeking equitable execution of that claim,"0 this remedy would not
phia, and Fox is similar to that of the insured, reinsured, and reinsurer, there is a differ-
ence in the fact that the insured can usually be expected to attempt to collect from the
reinsured, whereas in this case the creditor, with the mortgagor and the security of a
mortgage to rely upon, may choose not to collect from the Philadelphia Company.
13. The creditor's failure to act is unexplained. Respondents brief suggests that he
may have been delaying foreclosure in expectation of a rise in market values. But it is
difficult to understand why he has not proceeded against Philadelphia on its guaranty. A
possible explanation is that the plan of reorganization for Philadelphia provided that
creditors could prove claims only for the difference betveen the value of the mortgaged
premises and the amount of the mortgage plus arrears in interest. See p. 5, Brief for
Respondent, Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, 91 F. (2d) 907
(C. C. A. 2d, 1937). But since Philadelphia had made an absolute guaranty of the pay-
ment of interest and principal, it would seem that the creditor could claim for the full
amount.
14. See GrxN-, LIQUIDATION (1935) § 455.
15. See note 21, infra.
16. Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Earle, 110 U. S. 710 (1884) ; Travis Glass Co.
v. Ibbetson, 186 Cal. 724, 200 Pac. 595 (1921); cf. McConnell v. Scott, 15 Ohio 401
(1846); Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 919; (1934) 34 CoL. L. REv. 1140.
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be available after the appointment of a receiver for either Fox'7 or Phila-
delphia.' 8 The mortgagee must therefore file his claim in the Philadelphia
receivership as a general creditor,19 and if the ratio of the amount recovered
from Fox in excess of reimbursement to the amount of the mortgagee's claim
against Philadelphia for interest exceeds the ratio of Philadelphia's other
assets to its other liabilities, the creditors of Philadelphia other than the mort-
gagee receive a windfall20 at the expense of the creditors of Fox or of the
mortgagor.21 If the first ratio is less than the second, the other creditors
of Philadelphia will suffer a deprivation.
22
These objectionable consequences could be avoided by an order that the
recovery be held in trust for the mortgagee to the extent of full satisfaction
of his claim for defaulted interest. Doctrinally, this solution is facilitated by
viewing the arrangement effected by the series of related contracts as one of
successive suretyship.23 Although successive suretyship is usually associated
17. Assets in receivership are not subject to attachment or garnishment. See 1 CLARNC,
RECEIVERs (1929) § 571.
18. Though a separate suit against Philadelphia by the mortgagee would not be
stayed, the judgment obtained would serve merely as an adjudication of the claim, and
could not be collected by execution upon the assets or by assertion of a preference in the
receivership. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Theatres Corporation, In re Fox, 69 F.
(2d) 60 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934); GLENN, op. cit. mipra note 14, § 461.
19. Unless, of course, he could persuade the receivership court that this recovery
should be impressed with a trust in his favor.
20. If Philadelphia's other assets were $1,000,000 and its other liabilities $2,500,000,
and if the liability to the mortgagee had never been undertaken, the general creditors of
Philadelphia would have received 40 cents on the dollar in payment of their claims. If
the amount recovered from Fox in excess of reimbursement is $200,000, while the mort-
gagee's claim for interest is $300,000, the total assets will be increased to $1,200,000, and
the total liabilities to $2,800,000, so that the general creditors will now get approximately
43 cents on the dollar. See Comment (1936) 50 HARV. L. REv. 93, at 97, n. 20, demon-
strating how a similar windfall may occur in reinsurance cases.
21. This outcome depends on whether Fox has a right to reimbursement against
Market for the total amount paid to Philadelphia, or only for the amount of the mort-
gagee's recovery in the Philadelphia receivership. That Fox is entitled to reimburse-
ment for the latter amount at least seems clear. Cf. Howell v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934). Allowing Fox to prove for only this
amount would protect Market from claims for interest in excess of $300,000 [the figure
is based on the assumption made in note 20, supra]; but the creditors of Fox would
thereby suffer a loss.
If it be assumed, however, that Fox would be permitted to sue for full reimbursement
[see SrEARNS, op. cit. supra note 5, § 283], the loss falls ultimately upon Market, be-
cause, due to the insolvency of Philadelphia, the mortgagee's collection of interest from
Philadelphia will be less than Fox's payments to the Philadelphia receiver.
22. If the amount recovered from Fox was only $100,000, the other amounts stated
in note 20, supra, remaining the same, each creditor would then get only about 39 cents
on the dollar. This deprivation would be merely temporary, however, until the Phila-
delphia receiver sued the mortgagor for reimbursement to the extent of the difference
between Fox's payment and the amount paid by Philadelphia to the mortgagee.
23. See STEARNs, op. cit. supra note 5, § 264. This description of the arrangement is
not inconsistent with the court's interpretation of the Fox contract as one to indemnify
against liability, or to exonerate from liability [Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Fox Thea-
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with the signing of a note or a bond as indorser or guarantor,2 4 there is no
reason why such a relationship may not arise by virtue of a series of con-
tractual documents as well as by indorsements upon a single piece of nego-
tiable paper. Fox's agreement was not independent, but was related to the
other contracts to which the mortgagee, Philadelphia Company and the mort-
gagor were parties,25 for Philadelphia Company would not guarantee the
interest and principal of Market's loan unless Fox would guarantee the inter-
est.26 Since Fox thus appears to have assumed ultimate liability as between
itself and Philadelphia Company for the interest, the latter seems entitled to
the remedies of a successive surety against a prior surety, not only for reim-
bursement, 27 but also for exoneration. 28 In view of the insolvency and re-
ceivership of Fox, the exoneration might be effected by the method provided
for under the Bankruptcy Act, whereby a surety may file a claim in the
creditor's name against a bankrupt principal when the creditor has failed to
do so. 2 9 This result is possible on the theory that Fox, as prior surety, stands
in the relation of principal to Philadelphia, as successive surety. The Phila-
delphia receiver's claim against Fox would be proved for one hundred per
cent of Market's interest default, as in the instant case, but would be regarded
as having been filed in the creditor's behalf.30 The receiver would share in
the amount realized only to the extent of any surplus remaining after full
tres Corporation, 91 F. (2d) 907, 910 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937)]; it merely emphasizes the
interrelationship of all the parties, including the mortgagee and mortgagor as well as the
two parties to the Fox contract
24. Noble v. Beeman-Spaulding-Woodvrard Co., 65 Ore. 93, 131 Pac. 1006 (1913);
Jaronko v. Czerwinski, 117 Conn. 15, 166 Atl. 388 (1933); Mann v. Bradshaw's Adm'r,
136 Va. 351, 118 S. E. 326 (1923); see 1 BRANDT, Surrsmp AND GumuNTY (3d ed.
1905) §286.
25. See Comment (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 1053.
26. Cf. Noble v. Beeman-Spaulding-Woodvard Co., 65 Ore. 93, 131 Pac. 1006 (1913)
(plaintiff refused to guarantee corporation note unless individual members of the cor-
poration would sign as makers).
27. Ibid; cf. Hartwell v. Smith, 15 Ohio St. 200 (1864) ; AnANT, Sunmsnn' (1931)
§ 12. Arant uses the term "supplemental" to refer to the relationship herein discussed
as successive suretyship.
28. See ARNow, op. cit. supra note 5, § 125. Since a surety prior in liability stands
in the position of principal to the surety whose liability is successive, the suit by the lat-
ter before payment is analogous to a surety's suit for e.Noneration against the principal
debtor. See ARAxr, op. cit. supra note 27, § 72.
29. BANKRupcY AcT § 57 (i), 30 STAT. 544 (1893), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93 (i) (1927);
see Comment (1931) 31 CoL L. REv. 1348, at 1351 cf seq.
30. The surety is in no case entitled to any portion of the dividends paid on the
creditor's claim against the bankrupt principal until the creditor has been made whole.
Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 251 Mfass. 418, 146 N. E. 711
(1925). And if the creditor does file a claim, the surety cannot claim against the bank-
rupt estate at all. In re Hanson & Tyler Auto Co., 286 Fed. 161 (N. D. Iowa, 1922).
This principle of allowing only the creditor's claim to be proved has been adopted in some
cases where the principal is in receivership. See Comment (1928) 41 HAnv. L REV.
384, at 386, n. 14. Cf. American Surety Co. of New York v. National Bank of Barnes-
ville, 17 F. (2d) 942 (S. D. Ohio 1927) (creditor claiming in competition with surety
against the principal in receivership forced to reduce his claim by deducting the amount
paid him by the surety) ; SrmNs, op. cit. supra note 5, § 252, n. 53.
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satisfaction of the creditor's claim for defaulted interest. 81 This seems the
most reasonable procedure, regardless of the label employed to describe the
relationship of the parties.
RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGES *
THE federal bankruptcy courts are vested with power to discharge all
provable debts, irrespective of the residence of the creditor, the place of
contract, or the place of performance.' But foreign discharges will be ac-
corded a more limited recognition. Under the rule attributed to the Supreme
Court of the United States and to the New York courts,2 a foreign discharge
will be given effect only if the creditor was a resident in the bankruptcy juris-
diction, or a participant in the proceedings." Under the more generally pre-
vailing rule recognition is also given 4 to discharges issued by courts in the
31. See cases cited note 30, supra. The receiver for Philadelphia Company would
have a right of reimbursement against Market for the deficiency remaining after the
proceedings against Fox. ARaIrr, op. cit. supra note 27, § 73.
The suggested disposition of the Philadelphia receiver's recovery against Fox for
interest favors the mortgagee over the receiver, whereas the proposed distribution of the
tax recovery (see text p. 1016 supra) prefers the receiver over the tax authorities. Justifi-
cation for the difference is to be found in the fact that the mortgagee was the party for
whose benefit the series of contracts were drafted, but the tax authorities were not parties
to any of the related contracts, and no benefit to them was intended.
* Johnstone v. Johnstone, N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 6, 1937, p. 1014, col. 7.
1. 30 STAT. 550 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 35 (1934). This construction of the statute
seems to be generally accepted. Morency v. Landry, 79 N. H. 305, 108 Atl. 855 (1919);
2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935) § 375.1. See, in general, Comment (1930) 39 YALE
L. J. 559.
2. In Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213 (U. S. 1827), it was held that a discharge
pursuant to a state insolvency law could not bind out of state creditors. While this deci-
sion, like others involving state insolvency laws, turned on the constitutional restriction
against impairment of the obligations of contracts, the court erroneously assumed [SToRY,
CONFLICT OF LAWs (8th ed. 1883) § 335] that its decision was consistent with the Ameri-
can doctrine of conflict of laws governing discharges in bankruptcy in a foreign country.
The New York court in Phelps v. Borland, 103 N. Y. 406, 9 N. E. 307 (1886) felt
obligated to follow this declaration by the Supreme Court, although no constitutional
question was in issue, and although prior New York decisions had ruled otherwise [Oly-
phant & Sons v. Atwood, 4 Bos. 459 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1859)]. But the rule in state
insolvency proceedings that personal jurisdiction is not sufficient to validate a discharge
when the contract has been made elsewhere [Lowenberg v. Levine, 93 Cal. 215, 28 Pac.
941 (1892)] has not been carried over to international conflicts situations. See, in gen-
eral, DuBois, The Significance in Conflict of Laws of the Distinctions Between Interstate
and International Transactions (1933) 17 MINN. L. REv. 361.
3. This rule has received only slight support in the treatises. It is adopted in 2
WHARTON, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1905) § 531. See, also, MINOR, CONFLICT oF LAWS
(1901) § 191. 4
4. A fortiori, courts following this rule recognize a discharge when the bankruptcy
court has had personal jurisdiction over the creditor. Norris v. Breed, 7 Cush. 44 (Mass.
1851), Glass v. Keogh, 4 Wyatt, W. & A'B 189 (Vict. 1867); cf. Harris v. Mandeville,
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place of contract and of performance." Still undecided is the problem of
whether courts that follow the majority rule will sanction a discharge ren-
dered by a court in the place of contract or of performance alone,0 though
in England a discharge in the place of performance alone would probably
be recognized. 7
There have been indications that the minority view is losing some of its
support, for it -has been undermined by the Supreme Court in cases where
discharges were obtained in proceedings analogous to bankruptcy. Thus
compliance with a statute of the place of contract and performance which
allowed a debtor to obtain a discharge by depositing in court the amount he
claimed to be due on a disputed claim has been held to bar a suit by a local
creditor.8 And in a suit by an American resident on bonds payable in the
United States, the court has given effect to a Canadian statute, passed in
order to bind dissenters in a reorganization of the obligor, a Canadian cor-
poration.9 To justify its decision the court said that a bondholder who con-
tracted with a foreign corporation agreed to be bound by the law under
which the corporation was chartered. This doctrine goes even farther than
the majority rule, for at least in the case of corporations, it accords recog-
nition to all discharges made by courts in the country of the debtor's resi-
dence.'0
Ignoring these portents, a lower New York court has recently reaffirmed
the minority rule." A separation agreement executed in England between
the plaintiff, a New York resident, and the defendant, an English resident,
provided for monthly payments to the plaintiff in New York. After the
plaintiff secured a final divorce decree without alimony in New York, the
defendant obtained a discharge in bankruptcy in England. Although aware
of these proceedings, the plaintiff did not participate; instead she brought
an action in New York for accrued payments under the separation agreement.
On a motion by the plaintiff for summary judgment, the court held that
2 Dal. 256 (Pa. 1796) (citizenship apparently held to confer jurisdiction). But cf.
Gibbs & Sons v. Soci&6t des Mitaux, 25 Q. B. D. 399 (1890) (filing of claim).
5. Very v. McHenry, 29 Me. 206 (184) ; May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15 (Mass. 1851);
Peck v. Hibbard, 26 Vt 698 (1854) ; Bartley v. Hodges, 1 B. & S. 375 (Q. B. I61). A
discharge of a tort claim in the jurisdiction where the liability arose is held valid. Phillip3
v. Eyre, 6 Q. B. D. 1 (1870).
6. In Green v. Sarmento, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,760 (C. C. D. Pa. 1810), the court
charged the jury, "... that the law of the country where a contract is made, is the
law of the contract, wherever performance is demanded; and.the same law which creates
the charge, will be regarded, if it operate a discharge of the contract"
7. Beniam v. Debono [P. C. 1924] A. C. 514; CHmEHs E,PnRv.& ILrn xmozxA.
LAW (1935) 192, 390. The "place of performance" may sometimes be split: the creditor
may be required to complete shipment at one place, and the debtor to make payment at
another.
8. Zimmerman v. Sutherland, Alien Property Custodian, 274 U. S. 253 (1927).
9. Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527 (183). The court seemed
to regard the place of contract as unimportant.
10. The decision can be construed to apply to bankruptcy discharges, for the court
termed the reorganization scheme a "species of bankruptcy."
11. Johnstone v. Johnstone, N. Y. Sup. Ct., N. Y. L. J., Oct. 6, 1937, p. 1014, col
7, (1937) 51 H Av. L. Rr v. 736.
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since the English court did not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff,
the discharge would not be recognized.12
Even if the court had applied the majority rule, it might have reached the
same result, for it would have been faced with the undetermined issue whether
or not recognition will be accorded when the power of the discharging court
is founded solely on the fact that the contract was made within its jurisdic-
tion. And whatever rule was invoked, the court might have refused to
acknowledge the discharge on the ground that it was contrary to the public
policy of the forum, since claims of the type in issue are not dischargeable
under the American bankruptcy act.' 3
Choice of the appropriate principle to govern recognition of foreign dis-
charges should not be determined, however, by abstract legal theories, but
rather by conscious efforts to effectuate the purposes of bankruptcy statutes,
for refusals to sanction discharges not only thwart attempts to grant debtors
complete releases from their debts, but also penalize subsequent creditors
who have extended credit on the faith of a blanket discharge. It is clear that
both the majority and minority rules operate in rather haphazard fashion
to curtail recognition of discharges; yet neither rule is supported by per-
suasive countervailing considerations. The majority view has sometimes
been said to carry out the intention of the parties.14 But this rationale is
based on the assumptions that the parties to a contract contemplate bankruptcy
proceedings by the debtor and that they deliberately arrange the geographical
incidents of the contract to furnish the key to the proper law. The minority
or personal jurisdiction rule perhaps rests on firmer ground, for it may rep-
resent a fumbling attempt to recognize discharges only when the creditor is
likely to have received notice of the proceedings. But such solicitude would
seem to be misplaced, for bankruptcy statutes generally provide that notice
be sent to all creditors.15 And a firm that extends international credit will
normally be apprised of any major changes in the financial position of its
foreign debtors. It seems sound, therefore, to revise the personal jurisdiction
rule to fit its basic content; recognition should at least be granted when the
12. The court relied on § 375 of the RESTATEmENT, CONFICT OF LAWS (1934), which
states, "A discharge in bankruptcy bars in accordance With the terms of the bankruptcy
law all creditors who are subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." While the
rule fails to define jurisdiction, it is likely that personal jurisdiction over the creditor was
intended. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLiCt OF LAWS (Proposed final Draft, 1927) § 398
which included the word "personal" before "jurisdiction." The various state annotations
interpret the rule to mean personal jurisdiction, but they rely on cases involving state
insolvency laws as authority. See note 2, supra.
13. 32 STAT. 798 (1903), 11 U. S. C. § 35 (1934); In re Ridder, 79 F. (2d) 524
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 297 U. S. 721 (1936). But since in the instant case the
divorce decree could have been reopened and an alimony award 'made [N. Y. C. P. A.
§ 1170], it might be argued that the discharge did not run counter to the public policy
of New York. The defendant desired to have the divorce decree reopened. Communi-
cation to the YALE LAW JOURNAL from counsel for the defendant, Dec. 28, 1937.
14. Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1 (1816); Gibbs & Co. v. Soci6t6 des Me'taux,
25 Q. B. D. 399 (1890).
15. 36 STAT. 841 (1910), 11 U. S. C. § 94 (1934); Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & S
Geo. 5, c. 59, § 13 (2) (Sched. I, 3).
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creditors have actually been aware of the proceedings. Indeed, so long as
the statutory requirements of notice are complied with, a foreign discharge
might be held binding, even when a creditor has not actually received legal
notice, or has not otherwise acquired knowledge of the proceedings.1" This
rule is followed under the American Act 7 and is in accord with accepted
jurisdictional principles, for bankruptcy proceedings, like other in rem pro-
ceedings,18 may bind all the world. 19 Operating to limit the effect of this rule
would be the customary restrictions of conflict of laws doctrines. Thus dis-
charges would not be recognized when they were entered in proceedings
regarded as dissimilar in basic essentials from the bankruptcy law of the
forum,20 or when the discharge of the claim in issue ran strongly counter
to the public policy of the forum.2l Even with these limitations, well-nigh
universal recognition would be accorded foreign discharges; and adoption
of this rule .y American courts might serve to induce foreign courts, as
a matter of comity, to grant wider recognition to American discharges.22
16. Recognition of the power of foreign bankruptcy courts to discharge claims of
local creditors would not operate to insulate the debtor's local assets. For while local
creditors would no longer be able to attach local assets, the foreign trustee in bankruptcy
would be able to collect such assets. Under the American rule his title is good except
against claims of local creditors. Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 203 U. S. 570 (1903).
And all such claims would by hypothesis be discharged.
17. Kreitlein v. Ferger, 238 U. S. 21 (1915).
18. That bankruptcy proceedings are in rein, see Hanover National Bank v. Moyser,
186 U. S. 181 (1902).
19. Similarly, if the statutory requirements of notice have been complied with, an
order to probate a will can not be vacated on the ground that an heir has not received
actual notice or had any knowledge of the proceedings. In re Sieler's Estate, 89 Neb.
216, 131 N. NV. 204 (1911).
20. In Prentiss v. Savage, 13 Mass. 20 (1816), the court held a discharge under a
temporary insolvency law requiring creditors to file claims within thirty days to be in-
applicable to local creditors, even though the contract ras made and to be performed in
the discharging country. But a mere dissimilarity between statutes should not elicit non-
recognition. Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Mfinn. 225, 234 N. "V. 314, 868 (1931).
In Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 543 (1893) [see note 9, .spra]
the dissent urged that the discharge could not be upheld, since there was no provision in
the statute requiring notice to be given to creditors.
21. In Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 529 (1833), the court recog-
nized a discharge which concededly impaired the obligation of the creditor's contract.
See, also, note 13 supra. For general discussions of the public policy concept in conflict
of laws, see (1937) 47 Y.Aix L. J. 292, at 295; Comment (1933) 33 CoL. L Rzv. 503.
22. Compare Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U. S. 235 (1895) (applying the doctrine of
reciprocity in giving a foreign judgment conclusive effect), with Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U. S. 113 (1895). See Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad
(1919) 29 YALE L. J. 188.
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POWER OF BROKER TO CLOSE OUT ADEQUATELY-MARGINED ACCOUNTS *
As COLLATERAL for his margin loans, a stock broker customarily retains
the securities -he has purchased for his customer.' The powers of the broker,
as creditor- pledgee,2 are usually defined, though with varying degrees of pre-
cision, in a contract between the parties. The model agreement drawn up by
the Association of Stock Exchange Finns states that the broker may sell
without notice when in his opinion the margin becomes insufficient, and that
the customer will, upon demand, pay his indebtedness to the broker and take
his securities. It also provides that all transactions are subject to the rules,
regulations, customs, and usages of the exchange on which they are executed.
While it is unusual for a broker to terminate his dealings with a customer
for any reason other than a shortage of margin, in several situations he may
feel constrained to close an adequately margined account. Thus the customer
may have engaged in transactions which might involve the broker in litiga-
tion over the title to the securities. Or the broker would be guilty of violating
the Stock Exchange Rules if he continued to carry the account of a customer
who has accepted employment with a bank or an insurance company3 or has
indulged in the practice of three day riding.4 In such circumstances the
broker usually asks the customer to transfer his account, and the customer
almost invariably complies with the request.
A recent case defines the rights of the parties when they can reach no agree-
ment as to the disposition of the account.5 The plaintiff customer had adopted
an antagonistic attitude toward the defendant broker, the Louisiana branch
of a New York firm, and he was therefore asked to transfer his account.
Shortly after receipt of this request, the plaintiff left on a business trip. He
thus did not receive subsequent communications advising him that he would
be sold out unless he paid his debit balance or gave orders for the delivery
of his account. Although aware that the plaintiff had not received this ulti-
matum, the defendant sold the pledged securities. Upon his return to the
city, the plaintiff repurchased the securities and brought suit to recover the
loss occasioned him by a rise in the market, on the ground that the con-
tract only made provision for closing the account in the event of lack of
margin. A judgment in his favor was affirmed by the Court of Appeal0 and
the Supreme Court of Louisiana.7 While the court apparently conceded that
* Rembert v. Fenner & Beane, 177 So. 247 (Sup. Ct. of La. 1937).
1. Frequently the customer will pledge other securities as well.
2. This analysis of the broker-client relationship is adhered to everywhere but in
Massachusetts. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365 (1907); Markham v. Jaudon, 41
N. M. 235 (1869); MEYER, STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (1931) §§ 39, 41;
RESTATEMENT, SECURITY (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1937) § 12.
3. Without the consent of the employer, no firm may carry such an account. Rules,
New York Stock Exchange, c. 12, § 7.
4. Rules, New York Stock Exchange, c. 15, § 8 (b) (adopted Feb. 16, 1937) ; Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Regulation T, § 3 (e) (effective Jan. 1,
1938).
5. There is no question, of course, that the broker can refuse to conduct any new
transactions.
6. Rembert v. Fenner & Beane, 173 So. 551 (La. Ct. of Appeal, 1937).
7. Rembert v. Fenner & Beane, 177 So. 247 (Sup. Ct. of La., 1937).
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the defendant had a right to sell the pledged securities, it ruled that he had
not complied with the Louisiana Civil Code, which requires a judgment
against the pledgor before a pledge can be liquidated 3
Pledges that secure demand loans may be liquidated when the pledgor de-
faults by refusing to pay the loan on request 0 Since the maturity of margin
loans is rarely indicated in the contract, they have customarily been character-
ized as demand transactions. 10 But it could perhaps be argued that a margin
loan is extended for a period terminable only when the customer fails to
deposit the requisite margin. This constrtiction is especially plausible in the
instant case, for the contract only gave the broker power to close the cus-
tomer's account when it was insufficiently margined; it did not contain the
provision of the Association agreement that the customer will pay his in-
debtedness to the'broker upon demand. Although this argument gains sup-
port from the suggestion that customer's agreements, like insurance policies,
should be construed strictly against the party who draws them, 11 it is hardly
likely to be accepted in the courts. For while there have been no direct
holdings, the courts have repeatedly said that a broker is not obligated to
carry an account any longer than he desires, and that the customer is bound
to take up his shares whenever -his broker requires.' And in the case of
short sales, courts have held that the broker may close an account when he
wishes.' 3 This view is in accord with sound practical policy, for a customer
8. L. CMv. CODE Arr. (Dart. 1932) art. 3165. See DENis, LAw oF Psmon (1893)
§ 306.
9. JONES, COLLATERAL SECUITIES AND PLEDGS (3d ed. 1912) §§ 589, 607, 60.
10. See cases cited note 12, infra.
11. See Comment (1936) 46 YALE L. J. 97, at 99.
12. See Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U. S. 365, 374 (1907) ; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn.
198, 220, 26 Ait. 874, 881 (1893) ; Markham v. Jaudon, 41 N. Y. 235 (1869) ; Stenton
v. Jerome, 54 N. Y. 480, 483 (1873) ; Drake v. Hodgson, 192 App. Div. 676, 678, 183
N. Y. Supp. 486, 488 (1st Dep't, 1920); cf. Hughes v. Barrel, 167 Ill. App. 100, 120
(1912). Writers on the subject treat these dicta as establishing a rule of Jaw. CAZn-
:BELL, Srocx ozms (3d ed. 1927) 50; 1 Dos PAssos, STcOurMoKERs AND ST K Ex-
CHANGES (2d ed. 1905) 385, 386; GIm.Aw, Srocx ExcHANGE LAw (1923) 169; Umrr,
op. cit. supra note 2, 79; MosEs, STocimwxOsmmm LAvw roa SToc mno rzs AND TMI
EmPLOYEES (1937) 74.
13. White v. Smith, 54 N. Y. 522 (1874); Barber v. Ellingvood (no. 1), 144 App.
Div. 512, 129 N. Y. Supp. 414 (1st Dep't, 1911) ; MEYMr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 361; cf.
Sterling and Bunting v. James, 48 Barb. 459 (N. Y. 1867) ; Hess v. Rau, 95 N. Y. 359
(1884) ; dissenting opinion, Matter of Mills, 139 App. Div. 54, 62, 123 N. Y. Supp. 671,
677 (1st Dep't, 1910).
In the case of a short sale, there is no pledge relation unless the customer deposits
other securities. But the existence or non-existence of a pledge is only of importance
in determining the procedure for liquidating; problems of construing the brocer-customer
agreement are common to both long and short accounts.
Some of the cases involving short accounts concede that the broker has the right to
close the account, but say that the customer must be given a reasonable opportunity to
make his expected profit before he can be forced to cover. But it is actually no more
difficult to transfer a short account than it is to transfer a long one, except perhaps
when a stock is very inactive, and it is difficult to borrow the securities. If the dis-
tinction is thought to have any substance, it would be better expressed by imposing a
longer notice requirement than is imposed in the case of long sales. See note 16, infra.
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-will normally be able to transfer his account to another brokerage firm with-
out undue difficulty. Indeed, adoption of a contrary rule might make it in-
convenient for a firm to wind up its affairs, or to carry through a merger.
14
While the court in the instant case conceded that the broker could close the
account, it held that he had not followed the statutory procedure for liquidat-
ing a defaulted pledge. Though the Louisiana requirement of a judgment is
unique, provisions in other state statutes for liquidating pledges may some-
times be almost equally cumbersome. Typically, they require notice for a
specified period of the time and place of sale.15 These statutes are of course
superseded by specific contractual provision when an account is inadequately
margined. And while there is no need for immediate liquidation when a
broker seeks to close a fully-margined account, statutes such as that in the
instant case-and others somewhat less stringent-perhaps impose too onerous
a burden on brokers. It could conceivably be argued that these statutes were
not designed to govern stock trading, and that the common law rule of rea-
sonable notice' 6 should be applied. Or it could perhaps be maintained that
the provision subjecting the transactions to the customs of the exchange was
sufficient to vest the broker with a special contractual power to liquidate on
short notice. Even if the statute were held inapplicable, the court could still
-have reached the same result in the principal case by finding the notice insuf-
ficient. But speculation as to the devices open to courts who wish to circum-
vent the statutory requirements is probably academic, for the instant decision
will in all likelihood lead to the insertion in customer's agreements of clauses
empowering brokers to close accounts at will, if a specified short notice is
given.
17
GoRuoN H. SMITH t
USE OF CORPORATE DEVICE TO EFFECT ACCUMULATION OF ESTATE INCOME *
SUBSTANTIAL portions of the decedents' estates in two recent cases consisted
of the entire stock issues of corporations which owed the estates unsecured
debts. Through control as shareholders, the testamentary trustees were able
to force the application of corporate income to the reduction of these indebt-
ednesses. The life tenants brought suit to recover income withheld by the
14. While there would normally be no difficulty in obtaining customer consent, in
some cases it might be impossible to reach certain customers.
15. See, e.g., GA. CODE (1933) c. 12, § 609 (30 days); ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c.
105, §§ 80, 81 (60 days); MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Co-op, 1935) (60 days); N. Y.
LIEN LAW §§ 201, 202 (10 days).
16. Jones, op. cit. supra note 9, § 610. For a discussion of the notice problem, sec
Comment (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 628.
17. A provision that no notice need be given might be held against public policy;
for, unlike the case of an inadequately margined account, there is no pressing need for
speedy liquidation when an account is adequately margined.
t Member of the second-year class, Yale School of Law.
* In re Adler's Estate, 299 N. Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937); In re McLaughlin's
Estate, 299 N. Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
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trustees and, further, to reach corporate earnings applied to reserves for de-
predation and improvements. In each case the Surrogate's Court held that
these applications of corporate income were not binding in a contest between
life tenant and remainderman and ordered the amounts which had been with-
held by both the trustees and the corporations distributed to the life tenants
on the ground that they were invalid accumulations under the New York
statute' and improper allocations under the ordinary rules of distribution
between life tenants and remaindermen.
2
At common law, a testator or settlor could direct the accumulation of
income so long as the persons to take interests under the instrument were
definitely ascertained within the period permissible under the Rule against
Perpetuities.3 But since such dispositions of property tended to prevent the
full present enjoyment of income from trust estates,4 the Thelluson Act,"
outlawing certain directions to accumulate, was enacted in England. This
Act has served as a pattern for American statutes, which generally sanction
directions to accumulate only during a minority and for the benefit of the
particular minor involved.7 Under these acts, express directions to accumu-
1. N. Y. Pums. PROP. LAW § 16; N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAw § 61.
2. In re Adler's Estate, 299 N. Y. Supp. 542 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; In re McLaughlins
Estate, 299 N. Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937); (1938) 51 HAv. L REV. 937.
3. Thelluson v. Woodford, 11 Vesey, Jr. 112 (1805); Claflin v. Claflin, 149 Mass.
19, 20 N. E. 454 (1889) ; First Camden Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Collins, 114 N. J. Eq.
59, 168 Atl. 275 (1933). But, in England a beneficiary sui gencris could defeat further
accumulation by demanding the distribution of income prior to the time set therefor.
Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (1841). And some American courts have indicated
that trusts to accumulate will be refused execution beyond the period provided by the
Rule against Perpetuities, even though the beneficial interest is vested. See Girard Trust
Co. v. Russell, 179 Fed. 446, 452 (C. C. A. 3d, 1910); Colonial Trust Co. v. Waldron,
112 Conn. 216, 222, 152 Ad. 69, 71 (1930); felvin v. Hoffman, 290 Mo. 464, 493, 235
S. IV. 107, 116 (1921).
4. The public policy against accumulations seems founded on the same grounds
as that against undue suspension of the power of alienation but is thought even more
objectionable since both income and principal are tied up. See Goldtree v. Thompson,
79 Cal. 613, 619, 22 Pac. 50, 52 (1889); Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 122, 123
N. E. 135, 137 (1919); 2 StiEs, THE LAw OF Futumm Irr sm (1936) § 5S9. But
see Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 364,200 *N. IV. 76, 83 (1924).
5. 39 & 40 GEo. III, c. 98 (1800); Law of Property Act, §§ 164-166; Stat. 15,
Geo. V, c. 20 (1925).
6. For a listing and discussion of these statutory provisions, see 2 SisnFs, op. cit.
supra note 4, § 590; Schnebly, Some Problems Under the Illinois Statute Against Accu-
mulations (1932), 26 IiL. L. REv. 491, 492; Runk, American Statutory Modifications of
the Rule Against Perpetuities, of Trusts for Accumulation and of Spcndthrift Trusts
(1932), 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 397, 399440. Of these statutes, those of Arizona, Mich-
igan, Minnesota and Wisconsin apply only to accumulations of rents and profits from
real property.
7. Both these conditions must exist concurrently to sustain an accumulation under
this exception. Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 503 (183); Washington's Estate, 75 Pa.
102 (1874) ; In re Lowe's Estate, 326 Pa. 375, 192 Ad. 405 (1937). In addition to accu-
mulations for minorities, three states relax the statutory prohibition where charities are
concerned. N. Y. Puns. PRoP. LAw § 16, N. Y. REAL PROP. LA.w § 61; Pa. Stat. (Pur-
don, 1936), tit. 20, § 3251 ; Wis. STAT. (1937) § 230.37.
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late income -are invariably invalidated unless falling within some statutory,
exception. 8 Likewise, provisions which are not express directions to accumu-
late but which result in accumulation have been construed as implied direc-
tions falling within the statutory ban.9 This invalidation may be by elision
of the offending direction from the instrument where the claim of severability
is recognized through statutory requirement'0 or rule of law," or the entire
instrument may fall where the invalid provision is an integral part of a
general scheme of disposition.
12
But where accumulations result from either directions only incidently pro-
ducing accumulation or from discretionary action of the trustees, doctrinal
difficulties occur, for the typical statute outlaws only express directions. As
a result, some jurisdictions refuse to hold such accumulations within the
statutory ban.13 Others utilize the *absence of a direction to accumulate to
sustain only temporary accumulations such as those that occur when income
is withheld to equalize periodical distributions to the life tenant 14 or to
protect a life tenant incompetent to be intrusted with the full income.15 But
in each case the courts have been careful to state that the income so reserved
8. Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 16 (N. Y. 1836); Kilpatrick v. Johnson, 15 N. Y.
322 (1857); Pray v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 503 (1883).
9. Vail v. Vail, 4 Paige Ch. 317 (N. Y. 1834) (direction for payment of trust
income to beneficiary for support and maintenance only); Thorn v. De Breteuil, 179
N. Y. 64, 71 N. E. 470 (1904) (direction for reinvestment of trust income in subsisting
business of decedent after payment of certain annuities); Neel's Estate, 252 Pa. 394,
97 Atl. 502 (1916) (direction for payment of trust income to beneficiary for support
and maintenance only).
10. Mandatory provisions for invalidation of express or implied directions to accu-
mulate only insofar as such accumulations exceed the permissible minority term are found
in CAL. Civ. CoDE (Deering, 1937) § 725, Estate of Hinckley, 138 Cal. 457 (1881) ; IrD.
Aqx. STAT. (Burns, 1933) § 51-102; MINN. STAT. ANN. (Mason, 1927) § 806; N. D.
ComP. LAWS (1913) § 5293; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, § 3251, Brown v. Wil-
liamson's Exrs., 36 Pa. 338 (1860) ; and S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) § 300.
11. Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525 (1853); Kalish v. Kalish, 166 N. Y. 368,
59 N. E. 917 (1901) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Moy, 148 Misc. 38, 265 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Sup.
Ct. 1933) ; see RE.STATE FT, TRusrs (1935) § 65, comment c.
12. Dresser v. Travis, 39 Misc. 358, 79 N. Y. Supp. 924 (Sup. Ct. 1902), aff'd, 87
App. Div. 633, 84 N. Y. Supp. 1124 (1st Dep't 1903); Herzig v. Herzig, 140 App. Div.
514, 125 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1st Dep't 1910).
13. Gerin v. McDonald, 64 F. (2d) 394 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933) (construing the South
Dakota statute); Henderson v. Henderson, 210 Ala. 73, 97 So. 353 (1923); see Camp
v. Presbyterian Soc. of Sacket's Harbor, 105 Misc. 139, 153, 173 N. Y. Supp. 581, 589
(Sup. Ct. 1918).
14. Curtis v. Curtis, 184 App. Div. 274, 171 N. Y. Supp. 510 (1st Dep't 1918); In re
Sinnott's Estate, 310 Pa. 463, 165 Atl. 244 (1933) ; In re Mathers' Estate, 322 Pa. 358,
185 AtI. 768 (1936). But see In re Ilborne, 232 App. Div. 580, 582, 251 N. Y. Supp.
113, 115 (1st Dep't 1931).
15. Hendricks v. Hendricks, 3 App. Div. 604, 38 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1st Dep't 1896);
In re Hoyt, 116 App. Div. 217, 101 N. Y. Supp. 557 (1st Dep't 1906) ; Neel's Estate
252 Pa. 394, 97 Atl. 502 (1916) ; see Hair v. Farrell, 103 S. W. (2d) 918, 924 (Tenn.
1936). Contra: Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76 (N. Y. 1848) ; Gasquet v. Pollock, 1 App.
Div. 512, 37 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dep't 1896), aff'd, 158 N. Y. 134, 53 N. E. 1125 (1899);
see Antelo's Estate, 24 Pa. Dist. 181, 183 (1915).
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belongs ultimately to the life tenant or to his estate, and is not to be treated
as principal. Generally, however, courts invalidate any accumulation not
expressly or implicitly authorized by the dispository instrument on the theory
that any accumulation of income that results is impliedly directed.1" Where
an accumulation has occurred as a result of the trustee's discretionary admin-
istration the court is unable to invalidate any provision of the instrument
but must act directly upon the trustee"'--action which is taken not only to
prevent an accumulation but also to compel conformance to an intent imputed
to the testator to avoid accumulations.18
The fact of accumulation is generally readily discoverable. But in difficult
cases resort has often been had to the rules of apportionment between life
tenant and remainderman to determine what amounts to an accumulation.
Under these rules the use of trust income to reduce mortgage encumbrances
on the trust estate is not permissible.'0 Thus, while a few courts have said
that an explicit direction to apply the income emanating from a particular
parcel of land to the reduction of a mortgage is not an invalid accumula-
tion,20 the majority rule is that such provisions violate the statute. -' Where
an unsecured indebtedness is the principal obligation, as in the instant cases,
there is even less reason to sustain such an allocation of income. - The fact
of accumulation can hardly be denied since the estate held both the proceeds
of debt and the corporate shares whose equity was increased by a removal
of corporate indebtedness.
Under the rules of apportionment the burden of depreciation must, in the
absence of directions to the contrary, likewise be borne by the remainder-
16. Thorn v. De Breteull, 179 N. Y. 64, 71 N. E. 470 (1904) ; St. John v. Andrews
Institute, 191 N. Y. 254, 83 N. Y. 981 (1908) ; Billing's Estate, 263 Pa. 67, 110 Atl. 763
(1920).
17. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Foss, 257 Ill. App. 435 (1930); Watson v. Kennard,
77 N. H. 23, 86 Ad. 257 (1913) ; Matter of Jones, 136 Misc. 122, 23B N. Y. Supp. 753
(Surr. Ct. 1930) ; see RESTATh ENT, TRusTs (1935) §§ 182, 226.
18. Belcher v. Phelps, 109 Conn. 7, 144 At. 659 (1929); Matter of Bird, 241 N. Y.
184, 149 N. E. 827 (1925) ; Matter of Rooker, 248 N. Y. 361, 162 N. E. 283 (1928).
19. Garrett v. Snowden, 226 Ala. 30, 145 So. 493 (1933) ; Heald v. Michigan Trust
Co., 274 Mich. 225, 264 N. W. 351 (1936); Faulkenberg v. Windorf, 194 Minn. 154,
259 N. ,V. 802 (1935); Hascall v. King, 162 N. Y. 134, 56 N. E. 515 (1900). Contra:
Hutchins v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 203 Cal. 463, 281 Pac. 1026 (1923), rcv'g,
270 Pac. 219 (Cal. App. 1928); see Russell v. Russell, 109 Conn. 187, 205, 145 At. 648,
655 (1929); 3 Sims, THE LAw or FuTruR INTFrEsTs (1936) § 634; (1930) 65 A. L R.
1069.
20. In re Dolan, 79 Cal. 65, 21 Pac. 545 (1889) ; Hutchins v. Security Trust & Sav-
ings Bank, 208 Cal. 463, 281 Pac. 1026 (1929).
21. Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 62 (N. Y. 1836); Hascall v. King, 162 N. Y. 134,
56 N. E. 515 (1900) ; Walker's Estate, 16 Berks 185 (Pa. 1924) ; see 3 Sumes, Tim LAw
oF FuvuRE INERazsTs (1936) § 634; Note (1930) 65 A. L. R. 1069.
22. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Halsted, 245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739 (1927); Hegner
v. Hegner, 9 Ohio App. 147 (1917) ; Rhodes' Estate, 147 Pa. 227, 23 At. 553 (1892).
The Thelluson Act, however, expressly excepted provisions for payments of debts from
income. But this exception is included in only one American statute. ILT. REV. STAT.
(Smith-Hurd, 1937) c. 30, § 153.
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man.2" While the life tenant is apportioned responsibility for current ex-
penses, ordinary repairs, taxes and insurance, 24 the trust income can not be
charged for permanent improvements, special assessments, or rehabilita-
tion,25 even though the life tenant consents or will benefit through increased
income.26 Although variation of these rules of apportionment in favor of the
life tenant by direction will be sustained, there is but little indication that
a testator may direct the deduction of depreciation in computing income."1
Any intimation2s to this effect in these decisions might well be questioned;
for under such a rule the propriety of a depreciation reserve would depend
solely upon the testator's intent. It is true that the court stated that the cost
of improvements which had already been made but for which no depreciation
reserves could be properly set aside, might be amortized against income for the
duration of the life estate. 29 But this result, which adopts one of two possible
methods of placing the cost of improvements upon the life tenant, 0 would
not sanction maintenance of a depreciation reserve for future replacements.
Even if both of these practices caused invalid accumulations, the inter-
vention of a corporate entity creates difficulties in ordering the distribution
of both funds to the life tenant. The income used to repay the debt, which
was already in the hands of the trustee, could be given to the life tenant by
direct order to the trustee without doing violence to established precedents,
for courts have generally exhibited little reluctance to investigate the source
23. In re Chapman, 32 Misc. 187, 66 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Surr. Ct. 1900), aff'd, 59
App. Div. 624, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1131 (3d Dep't 1901), aff'd, 167 N. Y. 619, 60 N. E. 1108
(1901); In re Edgar's Will, 157 Misc. 10, 282 N. Y. Supp. 795 (Surr. Ct. 1935); see
In re Hilliard's Will, 299 N. Y. Supp. 788, 805 (Surr. Ct. 1937); In re Matthews' Es-
tate, 210 Wis. 109, 114, 245 N. W. 122, 124 (1932). Contra: In rc Housman, 4 Denlo
404 (N. Y. 1886). This rule is reflected in federal income taxation by refusal to allow
life tenants to deduct for depreciation. Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 35 (1934). But
cf. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Comm'r of Int. Rev., 47 F. (2d) 36 (C. C. A. 3d,
1931) (state accumulations statute preventing establishment of depreciation reserve held
not to prevent deduction by federal government of depreciation in computing taxable
profit from sale of trust property).
24. In re Van Riper's Estate, 90 N. J. Eq. 217, 107 At. 55 (1919) ; Stevens v. Mel-
cher, 152 N. Y. 551, 46 N. E. 965 (1897); see 3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935)
§ 600; STRACHAN, LAW OF TRUST AccouNTs (2d ed. 1937) 37-43; (1931) 71 A. L. R.
417.
25. Rendahl v. Hall, 160 Minn. 502, 200 N. W. 744 (1924); Spooner v. Dunlap, 87
N. H. 384, 180 Atl. 256 (1935); Hudson County Nat. Bank v. Woodruff, 122 N. J. Eq.
444, 194 Atl. 266 (1937) ; Chamberlin v. Gleason, 163 N. Y. 214, 57 N. E. 487 (1900) ;
see RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 233; 3 SmxEs, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
(1936) §§ 629, 635, 636.
26. Matter of Schaefer, 110 Misc. 628, 180 N. Y. Supp. 638 (Surr. Ct. 1920) ; Bank-
ers Trust Co. v. Moy, 148 Misc. 38, 265 N. Y. Supp. 77 (Sup. Ct. 1933). But cf. Croker
v. Croker, 117 Misc. 558, 192 N. Y. Supp. 666 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
27. See it re Chapman, 32 Misc. 187, 190, 66 N. Y. Supp. 235, 237 (Surr. Ct. 1900).
28. In re Adler's Estate, 299 N. Y. Supp. 542, 558 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
29. Id. at 558.
30. If the replacement is charged against the remainderman, he will have to finance
it by a loan, and the life tenant will bear the cost by paying interest on the money bor-
rowed.
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of corporate distributions, especially when these are extraordinary.3' But
since the depreciation reserves were retained by the corporation and would
not constitute funds in the hands of the trustee until actually distributed, 2
other solutions had to be found. In one of the instant cases a solution was
reached by ordering the trustees as stockholders to distribute the reserves
to the life tenant. 3 This action in effect amounted to a disregard of the
corporate entity-a result which may perhaps be questioned on the doctrinal
level. In the absence of fraud courts do not interfere in private litigation
with discretionary withholdings of corporate income ;34 in fact, courts will
enjoin the declaration of dividends whose payment will be prejudicial to
creditors.35 Moreover, an early decision had suggested by way of dictum,
subsequently disapproved but never directly overruled, that the statutory
ban against accumulations might be avoided by use of the corporate device.30
And finally, a failure to maintain sufficient reserves violates fundamental
principles of corporate accounting.37 On the other hand, there should be no
cavil over the decision on the policy level. A failure to disregard the cor-
porate entities would tend to produce confusion in accounting since estate
and corporate accounts are maintained on different bases. And, more im-
portant, where the corporate device has been used in an attempt to evade a
statutory prohibition or an established expression of public policy, courts
have been quite willing to disregard the corporate entity.38 This tendency
has been most pronounced in estate cases when remaindermen are trustees,
as they were in the instant cases, or directors.39
31. Cf. In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 375, 197 Pac. 90 (1921); Hagedorn v.
Arens, 106 N. J. Eq. 377, 150 Atl. 4 (1930); In re Chauncey's Estate, 303 Pa. 441, 154
AUt. 814 (1931) ; RESTATEMENT, TRusTs (1935) § 236 (a); 3 S.mJs, Tim LAw op FuT
Ixrmm'ss (1936) §692.
32. Managers Securities Co. v. Mallery, 77 F. (24d) 186 (C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; Ander-
son v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 172 N. E. 647 (1930); Forest City Mfg. Co. v. Levy, 33
S. V. (2d) 984 (Mo. App. 1931).
33. In re Adler's Estate, 299 N. Y. Supp. 542, 556 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
34. Wabash Ry. v. Barclay, 280 U. S. 197 (1930) ; Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co.,
199 Minn. 382, 272 N. IV. 277 (1937); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hewitt Realty
Co., 257 N. Y. 62, 177 N. E. 309 (1931); see FLETCmm, CoronATiozs (perm. ed. 1931)
§§ 5325, 5326; STEENS, CORPORATIONS (1936) §§ 99, 101.
35. Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N. E. 314 (1929); Ulness v. Dunnell, 61
N. D. 95,237 N. XV. 208 (1931) ; Gaunce v. Schoder, 145 Wash. 604, 261 Pac. 393 (1927).
36. Matter of Rogers, 22 App. Div. 428, 437, 43 N. Y. Supp. 175, 181 (2d Dep't
1897) ; cf. Congdon v. Congdon, 160 Minn. 343, 200 N. W. 76 (1924) ; In re Stevens, 46
Misc. 623, 95 N. Y. Supp. 297 (Surr. Ct. 1905).
37. 1 FINNEY, PRINclPLES OF AcoUNTING (1937) 379-394; ICEs-n, ADvAcED
ACCOUNrNG (3d Rev. ed. 1933) 571-578; MoINro RiY, AUD1TJG---TnERY AIM PRAc-
TIcE (5th ed. 1934) 534-570.
38. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minneapolis Civic Ass'n, 247 U. S. 490 (1918);
United States v. Milwaukee Refrig. Transit Co., 142 Fed. 247 (E. D. 'Wis. 1905); see
LATry, SUBS1MMDES AND AFFiLIATED ConRoAnioNs (1936) 5-40; ,Vormser, Piercing
the Veil of Corporate Entity (1912) 12 COLr L. REv. 496.
39. Ochs v. Maydole Hammer Co., 138 Misc. 665, 246 N. Y. Supp. 539 (Sup. Ct.
1930) ; see Matter of Gerbereax, 148 Misc. 461, 466, 266 N. Y. Supp. 134, 140 (Surr.
Ct. 1933); Matter of Steinberg, 153 Misc. 339, 345, 274 N. Y. Supp. 914, 922 (Surf.
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In the other of the instant cases, the screen to the accumulation established
by the corporate entity was removed by the expedient of dissolving the cor-
poration.40 This seems to be an unnecessarily drastic solution since the funds
were already in the hands of the trustee. Support may be found for this
result in the fact that courts have often sanctioned a merger of corporate
and estate accounts. 41 Also, continuance of the testator's business by use of
the corporate device runs counter to the established public policy in favor of
speedy liquidation of decedents' estates. 42 Further, a heavy burden would
be placed upon the Surrogates' Courts if they were forced to reconcile cor-
porate and estate accounts. But it is difficult to find authority for such action
in the statute conferring jurisdiction on the Surrogate's Court.43 And where
the testator was not the sole owner of the corporate shares, it would seem
wiser to leave these disputes to courts of general jurisdiction.
44
Ct. 1934); Matter of Lesser, 154 Misc. 364, 366, 277 N. Y. Supp. 123, 125 (Surr. Ct.
1935).
40. In re McLaughlin's Estate, 299 N. Y. Supp. 559 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
41. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532
(Surr. Ct. 1927); In re Ebbett's Estate, 149 Misc. 260, 267 N. Y. Supp. 268 (Surr. Ct.
1933; Matter of Steinberg, 153 Misc. 339, 274 N. Y. Supp. 914 (Surr. Ct. 1934); Mat-
ter of Lesser, 154 Misc. 364, 277 N. Y. Supp. 123 (Surr. Ct. 1935) ; In re Densen's Es-
tate, 163 Misc. 232, 296 N. Y. Supp. 567 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
42. Marshall Field & Co. v. Himelstein, 253 Mich. 355, 235 N. W. 181 (1931);
In re Kohler, 231 N. Y. 353, 132 N. E. 114 (1921); In re Nagle's Estate, 305 Pa. 36,
156 Atl. 309 (1931) ; see 3 BOGaRT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) §§ 571-574.
43. N. Y. SuaoGAr's COURT AcT § 40.
44. Pennsylvania applies this rule in all cases. Goetz Estate, 236 Pa. 630, 85 Atl. 65
(1912) ; Brown v. Maxwell, 288 Pa. 398, 136 At. 232 (1927); Watson's Estate, 314
Pa. 179, 170 Atl. 254 (1934).
